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ABSTRACT 
Since they first emerged into the public consciousness in 1994, the Zapatista National 
Liberation Army (EZLN) has gathered considerable attention and support on the world 
stage for its struggle with the Mexican federal government over the issue of indigenous 
rights.  The Zapatistas are now popularly viewed as indigenous rebels standing up for 
indigenous rights against the neoliberal economics.  Yet comparatively less attention has 
been given to its struggles with the federal government over an area of protected land 
within the Lacandón jungle known as the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve.  The 
conflict is centered on a large settler population within the Reserve and whether it is a 
threat to the jungle’s viability.  The environmental group, Conservation International (CI) 
believes that they are, yet the settlers enjoy the support of the EZLN, who opposes any 
attempt to move them.  Despite this dispute, the two organizations claim seemingly 
similar goals.  CI has declared that it is dedicated to local control over conservation 
projects.  Meanwhile, EZLN has been fighting for greater local political power in regards 
to indigenous government.  More striking still, is that this matter has placed the EZLN in 
direct opposition to the Lacandón Maya, even though it has portrayed itself as the 
defender of all of Mexico’s indigenous people. 
 
It is these apparent contradictions between the EZLN’s political positions and the actual 
sides of the conflict that make the struggle over Montes Azules worth examining.  
Beyond the simplified statements of public platforms, the objections of the EZLN to the 
reserve and its supporters to the Lacandones’ position are rooted in historical conflicts 
over decision making on landholding.  The EZLN feels that the government has 
constantly excluded indigenous farmers from decision making over this matter to their 
detriment and thus it feels that local control over land is a fundamental part of indigenous 
life.  As such its position on Montes Azules must be understood in terms of how its ideas 
of being indigenous come into conflict with the Lacandón Maya’s territory in the reserve 
and CI’s position on the settler population.  In this way indigenous identity is seen not 
merely as a matter of cultural significance, but a foundation for a concrete political 
agenda, which is articulated in the EZLN’s stance over Montes Azules.
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Introduction: 
Since the 1970s environmental conservation has become a major issue.  Even 
businesses make a public effort to assert their environmental credentials.  The Ford Motor 
Company for example, has publicized on its website its donations to and association with 
a Washington D.C. based environmental organization known as Conservation 
International.1  When Conservation International (CI) started work in 1987, it began not 
in the United States, but in Latin America.  Specifically it started in the nature reserves of 
the Beni Biosphere Reserve in Bolivia, the La Amistad Biosphere Reserve in Costa Rica, 
and the Gulf of California Biosphere Reserve in Mexico.2   CI’s primary concern lies 
with preserving the diverse variety of species within such areas.  In order to accomplish 
this task, it ultimately takes interest in the human populations living within these eco-
systems.  According to CI, it sees people living in endangered ecosystems as both the 
ultimate cause and ultimate solution to conservation problems in these areas.  As a result, 
CI has ostensibly adopted the idea of local populations maintaining control over 
conservation as its guiding principle in its approach to conservation and has stated that 
conservation efforts can only be successful if local people are in control.3 
Yet CI’s efforts have been met with cynicism from many sectors of the left.  To 
cite one example, at a 2004 picket of an Edinburgh Starbucks over union conditions 
protestors also criticized the company for its alliance with Conservation International.4  
                                                
1 N.A., N.D., “Ford Motor Company – Conservation International,” 
<http://www.ford.com/en/goodWorks/environment/natureAndWildlife/conservationInternational.htm> (16 
January 2006). 
2 Conservation International, The First Decade: 1987-1997 (Washington: CI Communications Department, 
1996), 65. 
3 Ibid., 4. 
4 Edinburgh-Chiapas Solidarity Group and Edinburgh IWW, 20 November 2004, “Protesters Picket 
Edinburgh Starbucks,” <https://www3.indymedia.org.uk/en/2004/11/301555.html> (17 January 2006). 
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Most of this scorn is directed at CI’s efforts in the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve 
found in the Lacandón Jungle, located in the Mexican state of Chiapas.  The Lacandón 
Jungle is currently the center of the one the most famous political conflicts in Latin 
American history in recent years: the dispute between the federal government of Mexico 
and the indigenous peasant rebel organization, the Zapatista National Liberation Army 
(Ejército Zapatista Liberación Nacional – EZLN). 
The Zapatista rebellion is widely regarded as an important example of ordinary 
people in the Third World standing up against neoliberal economic policies.  As a result 
the EZLN is celebrated among much of the left, especially since the EZLN’s opposition 
to these policies is a cornerstone of its principles.  The EZLN portrays its struggle as one 
of indigenous people trying to preserve their culture and their freedom against such 
policies.  In doing so, it has often been quite hostile to political interests in Mexico City 
which it sees as imposing their will on Mexico’s indigenous people against the wishes of 
the latter.  Conservation International on the other hand has allied itself with the Mexican 
government, which has shown continued interest in pushing neoliberal economic policies. 
My own interest in the matter was initially sparked by the seemingly unusual split 
in the traditional alliance of left-wing politics and conservation concerns caused by this 
issue, even more so given that defending indigenous rights has often been linked to 
maintenance of the environment.  However, my interest in this topic is more 
fundamentally rooted in my wider interest in grassroots social and political movements.  
In particular this interest is focused on those movements that seek to create their own 
forms of political and economic organization as alternatives to established institutions.  I 
originally developed an interest in this topic from studying the Spanish Anarchists’s 
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actions during the opening months of the Spanish Civil War.  Immediately following the 
onset of the war, the anarchists of Spain set up collectives in order to compensate for the 
shutdown of economic production that had occurred.  These collectives were not only 
meant to provide a material basis for resistance to the Nationalist forces, but allow the 
anarchists to carry out this resistance according to the forms of economic organization 
that they favoured.  From there, I developed a wider interest in other such movements, 
particularly those in Latin America where the dominant political and economic structures 
have repeatedly fallen short of the needs of much of the population, necessitating social 
movements that offer alternative structures. 
As far as this thesis is concerned, I am mainly interested in studying the identity 
of social movements and the process by which this identity is shaped.  Social movements 
that offer alternatives to established economic and political structures often define 
themselves in opposition to what they see as an unacceptable status quo.  In doing so, 
they create a group identity that places them outside of the political establishment and 
serves as a basic reference point for the alternatives that a movement puts forth.  The 
Spanish Anarchists, for example, were reacting against the semi-feudal conditions of 
Spain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as against early industrial 
capitalism.  This led them to propose that society should be organized along the lines of 
economic collectives that would be operated and controlled by producers.5  They did so 
as producers dissatisfied with the working conditions and political environment of Spain 
                                                
5 Murray Bookchin, “Introductory Essay,” in The Anarchist Collectives: Worker’s Self Management in the 
Spanish Revolution 1936-1939, ed. Sam Dolgoff (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1974), xv-xvii; George 
Richard Esenweh, Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement of Spain, 1868-1898 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989), 22-23, 27-28; Robert W. Kern, Red Years/Black Years: A Political 
History of Spanish Anarchism 1911-1937 (Philadelphia: A Publication of the Institute for the Study of 
Human Issues, 1978), 9-15, 25. 
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at the time.  To cite a Latin American example, the members of Brazil’s Landless 
Worker’s Movement, who seek to implement land reform in their country, refer to 
themselves as the “Sem Terra,” which means “landless” in Portuguese.  According to 
their English language site, this name has become a symbol of dignity among those 
involved in the movement when previously many of them had been called vagrants 
because of their landless status.6  The Sem Terra’s self-definition is telling in how they 
take their outcast status as a point of pride while calling attention to Brazil’s extremely 
skewed patterns of land and wealth distribution. 
The Zapatista National Liberation Army follows a somewhat similar pattern by 
taking its name from one Mexico’s great historical figures, Emiliano Zapata, a mestizo 
farmer who led an uprising against the Mexican government over issues of land 
distribution in 1911.  By doing this, the organization identifies itself with the agrarian 
issues that have been a major part of Mexican politics since the Mexican Revolution.  At 
the same time, the EZLN has also explicitly and proudly identified itself as being an 
indigenous organization committed to ensuring that indigenous rights are respected and 
fulfilled.  Much like the organizations cited above, these views are in part a response to 
the environment in which the EZLN operates.  The group’s origins lay in a cadre of 
Marxist urban guerrillas that went into the jungle in the early 1980s to foster revolution 
among the indigenous communities there.  Instead they integrated themselves into the 
communities, readjusting their views according to the experience of the residents.  
Eventually the organisation gained a predominantly indigenous membership.  When the 
EZLN did launch an uprising it was not to overthrow the government, but to call attention 
                                                
6 N.A., N.D., “Who Are the Landless or Sem Terra?” <http://www.mstbrazil.org/?q=quemsomos> (31 
January 2006). 
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to the material deprivation of the indigenous people of south-eastern Chiapas.  This 
image that the organization maintains of itself as a group of deprived indigenous 
Mexicans, who identify with the ideals of Emiliano Zapata, is what underpins its critique 
of the Mexican establishment. 
Considering these facts, it would seem that Conservation International’s vocal 
support for local control over conservation policies would make it quite sympathetic to 
the EZLN.  However, the EZLN has reacted negatively to conservation efforts in the 
Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, characterizing them as front operations for neoliberal 
economic policies.  Much of this attitude seems to stem from the involvement of the 
Mexican government in conservation efforts in the reserve as well as the actual 
conservation practices of CI.  This thesis sets out to examine this situation and show that 
much of the conflict is due to the EZLN’s identity as an indigenous organization standing 
up for indigenous rights. 
For the purposes of establishing a historical context, the thesis begins with a 
history of the Mexican Revolution.  The first chapter looks at the role that land issues 
played in the Revolution and how the government adopted Emiliano Zapata’s program of 
land reform in order to win the loyalty of the populace and thus avoid future rebellion.  
This chapter shall also cover how the government ended up abandoning this program in 
the 1980s under the pressure of debt and under a new wave of leaders who favoured neo-
liberal economics.  It is this abandonment of agrarian reform, and with it the supposed 
ideals of the Revolution, that has served as the main impetus for the Zapatista revolt.  By 
examining the role of land in the history of the Mexican Revolution one can better 
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understand the matters is necessary for understanding the EZLN’s attitudes towards CI 
and the Jungle itself. 
The second chapter examines the divide between Conservation International and 
the Zapatistas, focusing on how the two groups view the situation within the jungle.  
Despite its rhetoric of local control, CI’s viewpoint is still that of an American 
conservationist group operating in several different countries, but whose policies come 
from Washington.  This stands in stark contrast to the EZLN, who work primarily from a 
local perspective of events within the Lacandón Jungle, a view which is shaped to a great 
degree by a populist interpretation of Mexican history.  The clash of these two viewpoints 
defines much of the conflict between indigenous and conservationist groups within the 
jungle.  This chapter will also examine how CI’s ideas are applied to the Maya Biosphere 
Reserve (located within the portions of the Lacandón that fall within Guatemala’s 
borders) in order to elucidate how the organization operates in relation to local 
populations. 
This issue is directly connected to the matter of the EZLN’s relationship with 
Mexico’s government, perhaps the most important part of the conflict over Montes 
Azules.  The federal government’s involvement in the jungle in part affects the Zapatistas 
attitudes towards environmental groups.  The EZLN has maintained considerable 
antipathy towards whomever is in the seat of power in Mexico City due to a seeming 
indifference, and at times outright hostility, of various governments towards the needs of 
those indigenous communities in Zapatista territory.  For the Zapatistas’ this lack of 
concern is reflected in the government’s conservation policies in the jungle, which, like 
CI’s, involve little input from local populations and are regarded by the EZLN as front 
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activities for resource extraction by foreign multinationals.  As a result the EZLN claims 
that this process has facilitated the use of the military to clear Zapatista settlers out of the 
reserve so as to eliminate a major source of resistance to these policies.  These positions 
are also informed by the belief that the government’s approach is the driving force behind 
the administration of the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve.  By examining these issues I 
hope to demonstrate how the conflict with the government over the jungle is defined by 
the EZLN’s identity as an indigenous organisation defending indigenous rights against 
centralized political power and corporate greed. 
A more direct indicator of how this conflict has been defined by Zapatista identity 
is seen in the group’s perceptions of the Lacandón Maya, who provide the bulk of 
indigenous support for CI and the government in the reserve.  Much of the EZLN’s 
statements about Mexico’s indigenous people place their goals and aspirations alongside 
those of the EZLN itself.  This assumption is not necessarily unjustified given the 
widespread support for the EZLN.  However, the Lacandón Maya are an anomaly in the 
EZLN’s worldview since they have sided instead with the Mexican government.  The 
EZLN has never acknowledged this and only mentions the Lacandón in passing in their 
communiqués.  However, many of their supporters have reacted to the Lacandón with 
outright hostility, including questioning the legitimacy with which they use the name 
“Lacandón” due to their alliance with the government. 
 It is worth noting, for the sake of the reader, that my thesis is examining the 
underlying values and beliefs of a political organisation.  Many of its sources are writings 
by the EZLN or public reports of Conservation International.  Neither of these sources 
could be considered reliable pieces of evidence in themselves about events in the jungle 
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since both are the writings of organisations seeking to further their political agenda.  
However, this is not why those sources are used.  Instead they have been used in this 
thesis to provide insight into the thinking of the two organisations, particularly the EZLN 
whose ideas of what it means to be indigenous in Mexico are of primary focus in this 
thesis.  And in CI’s case, its public reports have been used to shed light on the 
inconsistencies between its rhetoric and actions, as well as where the organisation’s 
understanding of the political situation in the Lacandón jungle has fallen short.  As such 
these sources are used as discourse to be analysed rather than a reliable record of events.  
The conflict over the reserve is inextricably tied up in the historical conflicts that 
gave rise to the Zapatista Rebellion in the first place.  Much of the EZLN’s statements 
about the jungle are framed in the same terms that it has used in addressing government 
policy towards indigenous people and the economy.  The government’s abandonment of 
agrarian reform and other social programs has been a sticking point for the Zapatistas’ 
and the basis for the EZLN’s claim that Mexico’s indigenous people have been 
abandoned by the government.  In the matter of the Montes Azules, these issues are 
brought up to question the sincerity of the government’s conservation efforts and declare 
the necessity of protecting indigenous rights in order to protect the Jungle as well.  
Examining all of these points, it is clear that the Zapatista National Liberation Army’s 
position on the reserve is defined by its ideas about what it means to be indigenous in 
Mexico.  Consequently, the dispute over the Reserve should be understood in these terms 
if one is to understand the why the Zapatistas refuse to cooperate with either CI or the 
Mexican government. 
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Chapter One: The Mexican Revolution, Agrarian Reform and 
the Role of the Lacandón Jungle in Agriculture 
 The conflict within the Lacandón Jungle over the Montes Azules Biosphere 
reserve cannot be understood in isolation from the political history of twentieth century 
Mexico or the role that land reform has played in it.  One of the common themes of 
Zapatista literature is that the Mexican state has failed to concern itself with the needs of 
the rural poor, particularly Mexico’s indigenous people.  This grievance is hardly a new 
phenomenon in Mexican history.  It was the same grievance that led peasant leader 
Emiliano Zapata to rebel against the government in 1911 after the new President of 
Mexico, Francisco Madero, had failed to make good on his promises to enact land 
reform.  In the case of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista 
Liberación Naciónal - EZLN) this complaint was a response to the Federal Government’s 
abandonment of agrarian reform in the 1980s in favour of neo-liberal economic policies. 
This position is also a reaction to the Federal government’s often inconsistent 
stance towards land reform in the past.  In particular, it is a product of the government 
creating the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve in the Lacandón Jungle even though there 
were pre-existing land claims on the same tract of land dating back to the early 1970s 
when the government opened up the area to colonization in order to calm rural unrest.  
The most noticeable feature of this matter is that Agrarian Reform had maintained 
relative social stability from the 1920s up to around 1994.  During both the Mexican 
Revolution and Zapatista uprising, the key complaint of rebels was that the Mexican 
government had ignored the rural populace most affected by its policies and excluded 
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them from the decision-making process.  In the case of the EZLN however, this was 
complaint was specifically applied to the plight of Chiapas’ indigenous people. 
 Since the purpose of the thesis is to examine how the EZLN has responded to 
Conservation International’s claims that Mayan settlers have been deforesting the 
Lacandón Jungle, I must explain the role of land reform in the Mexican political 
landscape as well as the role that the Lacandón jungle has played in agrarian reform in 
Chiapas.  Furthermore, I must explain how these matters feed into the current conflict in 
Chiapas.  Mexico, like many other Latin American nations, has never resolved the social 
problems that arise from moving from a dualistic economy based on large estates and a 
subsistence agrarian sector to a free-market economy based on private property and 
export crops.  Unlike nations such as Guatemala or El Salvador though, the Mexican 
government was able to develop a system for keeping a cap on social dissent without 
resorting to continuous violence against peasants.  This system remained relatively 
effective up until the late 1970s.  This system was institutionalized land redistribution or 
agrarian reform, which guaranteed land to rural communities lacking it.  However, as 
seen from the historical record, agrarian reform in Mexico has never served as a solution 
to the disadvantaged position of peasants.  It has merely served as a stop-gap measure 
against political unrest from governments more interested in encouraging large-scale 
agriculture.  One of the results of this position was that the government opened the 
Lacandón jungle to colonization in the early 1970s in order to prevent peasants from 
trying to expropriate land from commercial estates. 
 The Mexican Revolution of 1910 was largely caused by the loss of village land to 
large estates known as haciendas or latifundia.  Much of this occurred during of the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century under Porfirio Díaz.  Prior to 1850, when Díaz 
became President, Mexico had been in a state of near civil war which greatly hindered the 
process of expropriation.  Díaz’s authoritarian regime afforded the necessary stability in 
which commercial agriculture could develop and sustain an attack on communal 
property.7   The construction of railways accelerated these processes by greatly reducing 
transport costs as well as connecting once exclusively local economies to regional, 
national, and international markets.  Soon the export sector was the fastest growing part 
of the Mexican economy,8 and plantation owners moved quickly into the nineteenth 
century international cane and beet sugar economy.  To aid their endeavours in fulfilling 
the demands of the export market, landowners lobbied the government to adopt policies 
amiable to their enterprises, including those that would allow them to obtain more land.9  
One of the most important results of their efforts was an 1894 law known as the Ley 
Lerdo which removed limits on landholding and defined as ‘public’ any land that was 
“not strictly delineated by legal titles.”  Under this law companies and individuals could 
‘denounce’ any such lands as ‘public’ and thus acquire a stake in them.  This not only 
applied to virgin lands, but also to village lands that were held by custom.10  The law led 
to a land grab on an unprecedented scale.  By 1910 land concentration had reached the 
point where four-fifths of Mexico’s rural communities and nearly half of the rural 
                                                
7 Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution Volume I: Porfirians, Liberals, and Peasants, I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 79-80. 
8 Knight, 80. 
9 John Womack Jr., Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 42. 
10 Knight, 95; Bill Weinberg, Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico (London: 
Verso,  2000), 44. 
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population were located within the boundaries of the hacienda.11  Those villages which 
remained independent lived a precarious existence due to lack of land.12 
 It was these circumstances that sparked a rural uprising in 1910 within the state of 
Morelos.  Land seizure had occurred prior to 1894, often when plots were left unguarded.  
However, the situation differed from conditions under Ley Lerdo since these seizures did 
not happen with any regularity.  As historian Alan Knight stresses, “it was not really 
policy, and no one considered it irrevocable.  Happily or not, social variety seemed 
eternal.”  The new legislation made land seizure systematic, seriously jeopardizing 
previously recognized water and land rights in the process.13  Though this process 
occurred across the country, in Morelos the situation was inflamed by Governor Pablo 
Escandón who acted openly in planters’ favour while at the same time refusing to adopt 
even a pretence of addressing the concerns of the state’s agrarian communities.  It took 
only the opposition campaign of exiled Liberal reformer Francisco Madero to embolden a 
peasant leader named Emiliano Zapata who came from the state’s most heavily armed 
pueblo, Villa de Alaya.  Zapata rose up in rebellion in support of Madero.14  Díaz 
abdicated quickly, though Madero’s hopes of establishing a stable liberal democracy 
were soon dashed by his failure to address the agrarian issue. 
On the eve of his rebellion against Díaz, Madero had drafted a manifesto known 
as the Plan de San Luis Potosí.  Its main theme was denouncing the illegitimacy of 
Díaz’s regime.  Yet among its provisions was a small clause that both denounced the law 
regarding untitled lands as well as promising restitution for any land acquired under these 
                                                
11 Ibid., 79, 95-96. 
12 Ibid., 96. 
13 Womack, 43-44. 
14 Ibid., 41, 52. 
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laws.  Zapata had studied this clause carefully and it led him to support Madero’s 
rebellion.15  Yet Madero had never envisioned a fundamental change in Díaz’s economic 
policies.  He merely believed that the greater liberty afforded by a representative liberal 
democracy would somehow address the problems that Díaz’s policies had raised.16  In 
this Madero had completely failed to understand what had driven Zapata’s army in 
Southern Morelos to support him.  Scholars tend to agree that the two men had widely 
divergent ideas about what the revolution meant and should mean.17  Madero’s stalling on 
the land issue eventually drove the two apart.  However, Zapata still would not have 
rebelled if not for the provocations of certain remnants of the Porfirian establishment, 
particularly Brigadier General Victoriano Huerta, who marched his forces into Morelos 
several times in order to quell disturbances which he attributed to Zapata.18 
The importance of land to Mexico’s peasants was illustrated in the adoption of 
Zapata’s cause by rebels outside of Morelos.  In the weeks following Madero’s 
inauguration as President, Zapata met with key followers on the hills near the Villa de 
Alaya.  There, under the guidance of local schoolmaster Otilio Montaño, they drafted a 
manifesto known as the Plan de Alaya.19  The plan basically expressed the dissatisfaction 
of Zapata’s followers with Madero’s failure to make good on his promises regarding 
land.  In it the Zapatistas vowed to restore not only those fields and lands seized from the 
villages, but also seize one third of any legitimately held lands from those proprietors that 
they deemed to be “monopolists.”20  Interestingly enough, the most important measure 
                                                
15 Ibid., 70, 72. 
16 Ian Jacobs, “Rancheros of Guerrero: the Figueroa Brothers and the Revolution,” in Caudillo and Peasant 
in the Mexican Revolution, ed. D.A. Brading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 77. 
17 Jacobs, 79; Womack, 127. 
18 Womack, 109. 
19 Knight, 309. 
20 Knight, 310; Womack, 402-403. 
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mentioned in the plan was the protection of village autonomy from outside political 
interference.  Zapatismo’s guiding organizational principle was the free association of 
landholding villages.  According to historian Alan Knight, the original Zapatista 
movement was fundamentally conservative, as were many agrarian rebellions of the time, 
in that it was reacting against the economic and social changes that were injurious to the 
traditional rural culture of the time.21  Upon signing the plan Zapata and his lieutenants 
formally declared themselves in rebellion against Madero’s government.22  The Plan 
would not have had much significance outside of Morelos if not for the fact that at the 
same time Zapata carried out an armed uprising, the plan was circulating throughout the 
countryside of Mexico’s southern and central states.  It was in these areas that the plan 
gradually won the support of much of the rural populace, who had experienced 
deprivations similar to those in Morelos.  As a result more and more of the rural 
population outside of Morelos joined the rebellion and declared themselves to be 
Zapatistas.  The success of the Plan de Alaya in galvanizing Mexico’s peasantry was such 
that rebels obtained the necessary strength to launch attacks on Mexico City’s suburbs, 
and even seized the capital with the aid of the rebel armies of Francisco Villa from the 
North.23 
The volatility of the land issue was not lost on General Álvaro Obregón when he 
assumed the presidency in 1920.  By then the Mexican government had changed hands 
five times.  Even though Zapata was dead by then and in spite of the fact that the 
rebellion was on its last legs, the Mexican government still found it necessary to ally 
itself with the cause of land reform in order to maintain stability.  Obergón’s predecessor, 
                                                
21 Knight, 310. 
22 Knight, 310; Womack, 397, 126. 
23 Womack, 171-172, 217. 
 15
the populist general Venustiano Carranza had already taken steps to doing so in 1917 
when he drafted a new constitution.  In its twenty-seventh article, the constitution 
recognized the rights of villages to hold property as corporate bodies.  In doing so the 
1917 Constitution gave formal legal recognition to the land-holding practices of 
Mexico’s rural population, which had previously been threatened by land seizures.  
Moreover, it allowed peasants to petition the government for land if they found they were 
in need of it.  That Carranza had made this concession can be traced back to the lack of 
success that past Generals had experienced in relying on sheer force to quell the 
rebellion.  Madero’s inability to deal with Zapata’s rebellion had led to his assassination 
and usurpation by General Huerta who felt that Madero had been too lenient on the rebel.  
Yet, Huerta’s significantly more brutal measures had only inflamed the rebellion to the 
point where most of the state of Morelos was on Zapata’s side.  By the 1920s the 
necessity of conciliation with the rural masses was no longer a radical concept.  Instead it 
became a tenet of orthodoxy for Mexico’s political establishment.24 
Obregón’s own contribution to land reform was to pass legislation in 1921 and 
1922 which stipulated that definitive titles to land could only be granted presidential 
decree.  This meant that Obregón and subsequent presidents eventually became closely 
identified with land reform.25  Moreover, the new President explicitly praised land reform 
in public statements such as in a speech in March 1923 in which he stated “The men of 
Morelos are, without a doubt, the best representatives of the ideals…of the Revolution 
and that is the agrarian ideal.”  Only a few years earlier even Obregón had viewed the 
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Zapatistas as mere bandits.26  Obregón’s successor, Plutarco Calles, also found it 
necessary to identify with the cause of land reform as well as the figure of Emiliano 
Zapata.  While campaigning against Obregón in 1924 for the Presidency, he declared 
before Zapata’s tomb that “this revolutionary program of Zapata, agrarian reform, is 
mine.”27  As President, Calles had the Mexican state play a greater role in 
commemorating the Revolution, even as he sought to limit land reform to attract more 
foreign capital.  However, Obregón’s modest reforms had neglible effect in the Mexican 
state of Chiapas where land holders had defeated the state’s revolutionaries and thus 
could avoid land reform merely by declaring themselves loyal to Obregón.28  As a result, 
land reform came slowly to the region. 
Before moving any further on the matter of land reform, the structure of the 
Mexican post-revolutionary state needs to be briefly examined.  Up until 2002, Mexico 
was essentially a one party state maintained by electoral fraud and cooptation of 
opposition groups.  Initially this system was a product of necessity in order to overcome 
post-revolutionary factionalism.  It was inaugurated by Óbregon’s successor, President 
Plutarco Calles,29 whose solution to the precarious stability of the Republic was to unite 
the disparate revolutionary groups under the aegis of a single political party.  
Factionalism was still rife after the revolution and the assassination of Óbregon in the 
summer of 1928 only served to exacerbate these divisions.  Calles handled the situation 
by formally stepping down in December of 1928 and handing the Presidency to Emilio 
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Portes Gil, a politician who was acceptable both to his own followers and those of 
Óbregon. (Even as Calles retained personal power behind the scenes.)  In the following 
year both sides united as the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional 
Revolucionaria  - PNR).30  Ironically these achievements were only fully consolidated by 
the man who unseated Calles.  In 1934, former revolutionary general Lázaro Cárdenas 
was elected to the Presidency and rechristened the PNR as the Mexican Revolutionary 
Party (Partido Revolución Mexicana - PRM).  The PRM was then reorganized along 
corporative lines so that soldiers and peasants played a greater role in it, while the power 
of generals was de-emphasized in favour of bureaucrats.  At the end of his term Cárdenas 
stepped down rather than retain any personal power.  This set the pattern for transfer of 
office and power that was followed by the ruling party until 2001.31  The PRM was 
renamed for the last time in 1942 as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionaria Institucional – PRI).32   However, Cárdenas’ importance in consolidating 
the power of the one party state lay not in reorganizing the ruling party, but in his social 
policies towards Mexico’s rural populace. 
Lázaro Cárdenas had a greater impact upon the Mexican political landscape 
because he carried out land reform more extensively than any President before or after 
him.  As a result, he won for the PRI government the loyalty of Mexico’s rural populace.  
During his presidency, some 17.9 million hectares of land, about twice the amount 
distributed by all previous revolutionary governments, was redistributed from stagnant 
commercial estates to approximately 810,000 peasants.  This land was often held in 
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common under a village in an organizational form known as an ejido.33  Cárdenas also 
attempted to promote collectively worked ejidos in order to use them for large-scale 
agricultural production.34  This redistribution of land broke up half of Mexico’s 
haciendas and gave much of their land over to ejidos.  Anthropologist George Collier has 
noted that because of these actions the government was able to win a great deal of 
popular support if only by symbolically positioning itself as the champion of the peasants 
and the poor.35  Cárdenas, also created an organization for agricultural workers known as 
the National Campesino Confederation (CNC) which ejidatarios had to join by law.  The 
CNC was built out of the surviving armed peasant organizations of the revolution and 
was employed to ensure the votes and the loyalty of the peasants for the government.36  
One example of how the CNC was employed comes from the Agrarian Rehabilitation 
Plan (PRA) of 1984, where the government of Chiapas purchased just over 80,000 
hectares of land to turn over to 159 peasant communities.  However, any community not 
affiliated with the PRI’s organizations were entirely excluded from those benefits.37  In 
this way Cárdenas established measures for ensuring the loyalty of peasants by 
selectively providing the benefits of agrarian reform to loyal partisans. 
Having established the national historical context for land reform in Mexico it is 
now necessary to focus on how these developments played out in the state of Chiapas.  
Initially land reform made little impact in the state due to both the aforementioned 
success of the state’s landholders against the revolutionaries, as well as their ability to 
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exploit loopholes in the agrarian reform law by subdividing their estates among close 
relatives.  This practice ended when Cárdenas’ candidate for governor, Efraín Gutiérrez, 
won the gubernatorial election due to support won from indigenous municipalities.  This 
support had largely been the work of his campaign manager, Erasto Urbina.  Urbina’s 
humble background, agrarian populism, and knowledge of commercial contacts between 
ladino merchants and indigenous communities were crucial in securing Gutiérrez his 
electoral victory.38  Urbina was rewarded for his service by being appointed director of a 
new agency to handle indigenous affairs and set up a union known as the Syndicate of 
Indigenous Workers (STI).  All workers hired to work in the north or along the coast 
were required to join the organization as well as sign a contract with plantation agents.  
This assured a legal minimum wage for coffee workers and treatment in accordance with 
the standards established by Cárdenas’ ministers.39 
As elsewhere in Mexico, this policy provided benefits to members of government 
approved agrarian organizations and helped to ensure peasant loyalty.  Urbina’s efforts 
went even further by redistributing a considerable amount of land in the coffee-producing 
Soconusco region of Chiapas40 which ensured that peasant loyalties lay primarily with the 
state and not their social class.  Consequently peasants struggled with each other to 
maintain the favour of the government rather than with those who were potential 
competitors for land.41  The significance of this achievement cannot be overstated.  Prior 
to the revolution, most indigenous communities in Mexico regarded the federal 
government as something remote and almost imaginary at best.  At worst, they regarded 
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the government as an “arbitrary oppressor.”  This view was partly fostered by the very 
local world view of Mexico’s indigenous people42 something ethnographer John 
Watanabe observed while studying the inhabitants of a Mayan town in Guatemala, who 
had an assumed moral superiority towards outsiders, be they Mayan or Ladinos.  
Watanabe also discovered that those Maya and Ladinos living within the community 
regarded each other with wary ambivalence and rarely mixed.43  That Urbina could 
secure the loyalty of Chiapas’ rural communities to the Mexican state illustrates how 
successful agrarian reform was as a tool for ensuring political loyalty in the countryside. 
And while Cárdenas’ reforms refashioned the political landscape in Mexico they 
did not significantly change the socioeconomic position of the average indigenous 
peasant.  At the end of Cárdenas’ administration half the latifundia were still intact while 
half of Mexico’s peasants remained landless.44  Furthermore, though Cárdenas 
emphasized large scale commercial production in the ejidos, his policies kept them 
dependent upon the Mexican state.  The Ejidal Banks that he set up to supply ejidos 
provided not only credit, but organised production and sales of harvests, as well as 
representing the ejido to the local and state authorities.  Yet this institutionalized 
dependence in ejidos on the state for resources and planning when the state would not 
always act in their interests.45  Cárdenas’ reforms still had a paternalistic quality to them.  
However, even if the Mexican government had approached the matter differently it 
lacked the necessary money to properly capitalize most ejidos at the time.  As a result the 
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necessary irrigation to develop ejidos into viable agricultural ventures was lacking.46  
Moreover, however radical his measures may have seemed, Cárdenas still pulled back, 
sharply curtailing land reform in 1937 in response to negative reaction by large 
landholders and the middle class.47  In the end Cárdenas’ reforms never entirely changed 
the social and economic situation of Mexico’s peasants.  They were still kept in a 
dependent position both as a result of the financial and political limits of the land reform 
and because they were used as a tool for political control. 
In the case of Chiapas, particularly in the state’s eastern half, the peasantry was in 
a more disadvantaged position than those in the rest of the country.  While Cárdenas had 
made significant expropriations elsewhere in the country, in Chiapas his representatives 
had mostly turned over marginal lands that had been appropriated from indigenous 
communities by highland ranchers in the 19th century.48  Whatever Gutiérrez had planned 
to achieve, land reform in Chiapas always seemed carefully designed to avoid 
antagonizing landowners.  One of the most telling instances was agrarian reform in the 
coffee producing region of Soconusco where the opposition of hacendados quickly 
subsided because expropriation under the agrarian law did not include their processing 
facilities or their best equipment.  Moreover, there was no major program to provide the 
ejidos with the equipment needed to process their crop for sale.  Therefore, they remained 
dependent upon the haciendas to purchase their coffee crops in order to prepare them for 
sale.  Meanwhile, large landholders could easily avoid incurring the costs of growing 
coffee under this system.  Land reform in the Soconusco primarily benefited private 
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landowners since it provided the latifundia with a protective buffer of underproductive 
ejidos whose lack of capital contributed to the latifundia prosperity.49  Once Cárdenas 
had departed from office in 1940, his successors promptly dropped his reforms, as well as 
reversing several of them.  As a result, the STI devolved into a minor branch of the state 
bureaucracy and lost its power to organize plantations workers.  It ended up effectively 
becoming a hiring agency for the coffee estates.  Meanwhile, landholders began dealing 
with militancy among labourers by importing less militant workers from Guatemala.50 
However, this did not spell the end of agrarian reform in Chiapas as it still proved 
necessary to deal with subsequent disturbances.  Due to Chiapas’ rising population 
peasants were applying once more for land under the agrarian reform laws by the 1950s.  
Again the government turned to less valuable lands that lay outside of the plantations.  As 
soon as the population had outstripped these new parcels in the 1960s they once again 
filed claims for land.  This time they petitioned for parcels on the more valuable lands of 
the commercial estates.  Claimants found it necessary to invade these lands in order to lay 
claim to them since the agrarian law only applied to lands within seven kilometres of the 
communities.  Landowners responded by calling for the government to stop the invasions 
while at the same time meeting the invaders with armed force.  Consequently, these land 
invasions nearly brought certain areas of rural Mexico to a state of guerrilla warfare.51  
Prior to this the country had experienced relatively few serious political upheavals since 
Cárdenas, yet now that population was outstripping available land, Mexico broke out into 
in conflict again.  Given the history of the revolution and the land conflicts of the 1960s 
in Chiapas, the political stability of Mexico in the twentieth century seems to have been 
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inextricably linked with how the government managed the need for land among the rural 
population.  In the 1960s the country was faced with armed conflict over a lack of land 
with which to satisfy the needs of its rural population.  It was in this context that the 
Mexican government would yet again return to agrarian reform to quell unrest in the 
countryside in the 1970s. 
Before dealing this matter, it is necessary to finishing illustrating the importance 
of agrarian reform to Mexico’s political stability by showing the government’s 
abandonment of this policy triggered the 1994 Zapatista uprising.  The 1980s opened 
with Mexico in economic crisis.  The country had experienced an oil boom during the 
1970s which led the government to borrow heavily from foreign countries to finance a 
variety of development projects.  When oil prices abruptly declined, Mexico found itself 
heavily in debt.52  By 1982 the nation’s foreign debt was some $82 billion.  The IMF 
offered to help on the condition that Mexico adopt a structural adjustment program which 
involved, among other measures, reducing restrictions on foreign investment, privatizing 
state-owned enterprises, cutting social spending, and freezing minimum wages.53  In 
effect this meant abandoning the corporatist state54 which had been based on the use of 
social programs as a sop for popular discontent.  The PRI’s economic reorientation 
culminated in the election of Carlos Salinas de Gortari as President of Mexico in 1988.  
Salinas not only stepped up the IMF’s restructuring program, but on 7 November 1991 he 
revised Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, the very basis of Mexico’s agrarian 
reform.  One of the most significant changes he made was to expunge section 10 of 
Article 27.  The section had read, “Those nuclei of population who lack ejidos or cannot 
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obtain restitution by lack of title, […] shall be equipped with lands and water sufficient 
for those constituting [the ejido].”55  With its deletion Salinas had effectively ended 
agrarian reform.  The Constitution no longer guaranteed that ejidos would be furnished 
with land when they were in need of it.  Moreover, section 4 of Article 27 was rewritten 
so that commercial properties could acquire rural lands and that ejidatarios could transfer 
titles to the ejido land between each other.  In practice this was taken to mean that ejidal 
land could be sold, rented, and mortgaged.56  Salinas and his advisors’ made these 
changes believing that the ejido sector would never be competitive on the world market 
and that by opening the way to their privatization, these lands would receive investment 
and bring Mexico’s peasantry into a modern agricultural sector.57 
Contrary to Salinas’ prediction though, most observers have claimed that the 
reform of Article 27 led to EZLN’s 1994 uprising.  During the time of the Article’s 
revision, the National Indian Institute (INI) had warned that changing the agrarian law in 
this fashion would threaten Mexico’s political and social stability.  The institute’s 
reasoning for this was that about 360,000 hectares of land held by ejidatarios would be in 
dispute and that less than two-thirds of the ejidos had the potential to develop capitalist 
enterprises.58  From this it reasoned that the hopes of Salinas’ and his advisors were not 
feasible.  These predictions are supported by the Zapatistas’ own explanations for the 
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uprising.  For example, the Third Declaration claimed that the political crisis in south-
eastern Mexico resulting from the Zapatista rebellion demonstrated “the government’s 
incapacity to resolve, at their roots, the political and social problems of Mexico.”59    
Though the Declaration never mentions Article 27 explicitly, it is clear that this statement 
is a reference the problems of land distribution that have continually plagued Mexico.  
This impression is reinforced by a 2003 letter written by Subcomandante Marcos on July 
25 in which he claims that Salinas’ revision of Article 27 led to a drastic increase in the 
poverty of many of Chiapas’ indigenous communities.  In the letter, Marcos describes 
how, following the changes to the law, he received frequent reports from other Zapatista 
villages of the deaths of children under five and their mothers.  Moreover, he received 
these reports daily and without relent.60  This may be why Marcos described the Zapatista 
decision to go to war as a choice between dying quietly from starvation or dying by 
military force while drawing attention to the plight of Southeastern Chiapas.61  Marcos’ 
account of the decision to go to war on the part of the EZLN’s comandantes also supports 
this explanation.  At the end of January 1993 the Clandestine Committee told him that 
they were going to take up arms against the government.  When Marcos expressed his 
doubts about the feasibility of the operation he was told by the Committee, “We don’t 
want to know what’s happening in the rest of world.  We are dying and we have to ask 
the people.”62 
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Still the reform of Article 27 should not overshadow that in some ways the 
rebellion was a long time coming given the way in which independent political 
organizing had been handled by the PRI.   Prior to the EZLN, Chiapas already had a 
considerable history of independent political organizing, though many of these efforts 
were stifled by military repression.  For example, the EZLN was originally a regional 
network of armed self-defence units set up in response to repression by the military.63  
Even the relatively successful Uníon de Uníones (UU), which managed to gain a 
suspension on eviction orders against twenty-six ejidos through peaceful protest, had to 
contend with violence against its members such as the violent evictions of over 100 UU 
supporters from their homes by CNC supporters.64  Another example is that of the 
community of Venustiano Carranza, which had spent 1974 to 1976 engaged in largely 
peaceful political activity in order to secure the authorization of the state government to 
have the community’s communal land officially demarcated.  However, their leader, 
Martínez Villatoro, ended up being assassinated.  When the community went after the 
suspected assassins the military invaded and arrested their entire leadership.  
Consequently, the residents of Venustiano Carranza came to regard the government as an 
enemy rather than a neutral arbiter.65  In many ways Venustiano Carranza’s change in 
attitude towards the government is as dramatic as the shift in attitude by Mexico’s 
farming communities in the 1930s when the government adopted agrarian reform.  
However, the government’s violence against the community served only to turn 
Venustiano Carranza’s inhabitants against it, as it had with the member communities of 
the EZLN. 
                                                
63 Ibid., 165. 
64 Ibid., 86-87. 
65 Ibid., 101-103. 
 27
Still matters of political activism such as those detailed above cannot be separated 
from the EZLN’s concerns over agrarian reform.  Venustiano Carranza’s activities 
revolved around ensuring the integrity of their communal land while the original 
rebellion by Zapata had occurred because the state government of Morelos was openly 
acting in favour of plantation owners in land disputes.  This may explain why the EZLN’s 
political program is oriented around decentralized, local forms of government, much like 
that of Zapata’s.  Both the Third and Fourth Declarations of the Lacandón Jungle make 
numerous references to recognizing indigenous culture, the failure of the federal 
government to do so, as well as the skewed distribution of wealth in the country and the 
hunger of Chiapas’ indigenous people.66  The EZLN’s claims that these problems can 
only be solved if the government is willing to recognize indigenous peoples’ own forms 
of social, political, and cultural organization.  Neither declaration explains exactly what 
this means outside of the Third Declaration’s references to indigenous people having the 
right to ‘autonomy.’67 
In practice ‘autonomy’ seems to refer to the Zapatistas’ Autonomous 
Municipalities.  Conceptually the Autonomous Municipalities appear to be political units 
where decision making is devolved down to the local level as much as possible while the 
EZLN is forced to consult them on their decisions.  Marcos refers to the principle 
involved as “obeying the governed.”  Following this principle, in the Autonomous 
Municipality system local officials could be recalled at will if they were seen as failing in 
their duties.  Furthermore, officers in the EZLN’s command could not hold any local 
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offices68 apparently to prevent domination of local politics by a military organization 
given that Marcos has referred to the EZLN as an “undemocratic” element in direct 
community democracy.69  Adopting such locally oriented political structures seems to be 
tied up with the EZLN’s experiences dealing with the Mexican government and land 
reform.  In preparing to revise Article 27, Salinas employed the CNC among other 
organizations in order to propagandize for the reform.  Yet June Nash claims that Salinas 
consistently ignored the indigenous sectors of Mexican society.  Much of the opposition 
to the reform came from independent peasant organizations that had large indigenous 
memberships such as the Popular Union or the Independent Centre of Agricultural 
Workers and Campesinos, who maintained protests throughout 1991, even after the Bill 
was signed on 1 December of that year.70  In this context, the locally-oriented nature of 
political organization for the Zapatista territories is a response to the Mexican 
government’s lack of concern for their own socio-economic needs.  However, Marcos 
claims that this is not the case and in fact the direct democracy of the EZLN’s 
organization came out of practices that the communities already had in place as well as 
the necessity of listening to their needs in order to accomplish anything.71  Marcos also 
claims, in the same interview, that the situation of the indigenous communities led to a 
way of political organization concerned primarily with the “survival of the collective.”72 
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Chapter Two: Conservation International and the Zapatistas, 
the Conflict of Conservation and Culture 
The poverty of south-eastern Chiapas’s indigenous people, as well as the EZLN’s 
struggle against the government to maintain its own political norms, furnish the backdrop 
for the dispute with Conservation International (CI) over of the Montes Azules Biosphere 
Reserve.  The conflict’s roots lie in the Mexican government encouraging the settlers to 
colonize the Lacandón Jungle in the early 1970s while simultaneously bowing to pressure 
from conservationists to protect the jungle, both for the sake of the jungle itself and the 
Lacandón Indians who reside in it.  Conservation International’s involvement in the 
region began before the rebellion when it purchased some debt from the Mexican 
government in exchange for the government devoting certain resources to conservation 
efforts in the region.  The nature reserve model that CI supports has been criticized for 
ignoring both the politics of the areas upon which the model is imposed and the needs of 
its inhabitants, a feature which seems to have an impact on how CI approached the 
situation in the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve.  The Zapatistas emphasize their 
former rights under the Agrarian Reform law and their belief that they have been 
wronged by the Mexican government.  Meanwhile CI stresses the need to protect the 
reserve and create ecologically friendly business ventures for some of its inhabitants.  
Neither party seems to address each other’s rather divergent goals.  This is especially true 
of CI which insists on trying to execute its conservation efforts, including relocating 
settlers, in a politically tense region while ignoring not only key elements of the conflict, 
but other possible causes for deforestation as well.  This is due to the fact that CI is not 
really concerned with the needs of local populations so much as protecting natural areas 
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according to its own criteria.  Consequently it cannot cooperate with the EZLN whose 
political agenda is driven by the need for its indigenous communities to have control over 
their own land.  
The dispute’s history began when the government resorted to land reform in order 
to quell popular unrest.  In 1970, Luis Echeverría became President of the Mexican 
Republic just two years after the Mexican army killed an estimated three hundred 
protestors in the Plaza de Tres Culturas in the centre of Tlatelolco.  The victims had been 
a part of a series of protests against the PRI’s one-party rule as well as the extravagance 
of the upcoming 1968 Olympic Games when most Mexicans lived in poverty.  The 
government had been eager to end the demonstrations in order to prevent them from 
disrupting the upcoming Olympics.73  Since he held the position of Minister of the 
Interior at the time, Echeverría received a great deal of the blame for the massacre and 
thus he sought to improve his image through the use of populist measures after he 
became President.  As a consequence of this, public expenditure rose to twenty-eight 
percent of the GDP during Echeverria’s administration as more money was devoted to 
social programs.74  This rise in public spending was also a response to a spate of 
invasions of large estates in central and northern Mexico by landless peasants.75  The 
President tried to stop these invasions by opening up unpopulated land for settlement in 
the state of Chiapas.  Much of this land lay in one of Mexico’s last remaining frontiers: 
the tropical rainforest of the Lacandón Jungle. 
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The Lacandón had already served as a source of land for those families who had 
received land in the 1930s and 1940s, but who had outgrown their plots in the 1950s.  
These families had responded to the situation by either working on estates in the central 
Grijalva Valley and the Soconusco or looking for land to colonize in eastern Chiapas 
forests.76  When a new wave of colonization came in the 1970s, the government gave 
settlers incentives such as fifty hectares of land, cattle credit, and a promise that the state 
would purchase any wood they cut to settle in the jungle.77 
However, as the jungle was being colonized, Echeverría ended up vacillating on 
his colonization policy in order to offer concessions to environmentalists.  This shift in 
policy was motivated by the fact that by the 1970s the world’s scientific community was 
beginning to notice the destruction of the forest by slash-and-burn colonization and how 
this activity was endangering the previously isolated Lacandón Maya, the last lowland 
Mayan forest culture.78  Thanks to international pressure by conservationists and the 
advocacy of Swiss naturalist Gertrude Duby Blom on behalf of the Lacandones, a 
Presidential decree was issued in 1971 granting 688,000 hectares of land to the heads of 
66 Lacandón Indian families.  The grant’s size was dictated by the Lacandones 
supposedly requiring large areas of the forest in order to practice their traditional way of 
life.  However, some of this land had already been settled by about a dozen Tzeltal 
families who had set up about five communities in 1934, effectively rendering some 
200,000 settlers squatters on their own lands.79 
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The government’s creation of a nature reserve in the central-west jungle only 
further complicated the situation.  An official decree issued on 12 January 1978 
established the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve.80  The reserve was covered under the 
Federal Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Protection of the Environment (Ley General 
de Equilibrio Ecológico y la Proteción al Ambiente - LGEE) which provided legislation 
for establishing protected natural areas in order to preserve biodiversity.  This included 
provisions for regulating the possession, control and use of land in the protected areas.  
These provisions also prevented the government from recognizing any new land claims in 
protected areas.81  According to the Ricardo Flores Magón Municipality and an article 
written by the Chiapas’ Independent Media Centre, the establishment of the reserve 
invalidated many existent land claims by declaring them illegal.82  Both sources claim 
that a full thirty percent of the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve falls outside of the 
jungle.  As a result its boundaries needlessly affect the land tenure of hundreds more 
indigenous communities.83 
Conservation International became involved in the matter in 1991 when it 
purchased $4 million of Mexico’s foreign debt in exchange for the government spending 
nearly $2.6 million on preservation programs for the Lacandón.  Many of these funds 
were earmarked for a research station in the reserve devoted to studying the jungle’s 
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shrinking collection of species.84  As a consequence CI has ended up clashing with the 
Zapatistas over the communities within the reserve. 
Since the uprising of 1994, there has been a new influx of settlers into the reserve; 
CI has been attempting to relocate them to areas outside of the reserve with the aid of the 
Mexican government.85  According to CI, the jungle’s top soils are rich in nutrients, yet 
relatively thin since the tropical climate causes organic matter to decay rapidly.  This 
means that nutrients are quickly recycled back into the forest canopy.  If an area is 
cleared for farmland the soil is depleted after one or two years of intense productivity and 
the farmers are forced to push deeper into the forest.86  As a result CI claims that 
colonization poses a threat to the forest’s integrity and seeks to relocate the communities.  
However, more than half of the communities within the reserve whose presence has been 
deemed illegal are Zapatista supporters and the EZLN has explicitly stated that it will 
oppose any attempts to remove the settlers.87  According to Bill Weinberg, the Indian 
communities within the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve are among the poorest in 
Chiapas88 which may explain the level of bitterness that communities such as Ricardo 
Flores Magón have directed at the Mexican government’s concessions to the Lacandón 
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people and environmentalists.  After all, Subcomandante Marcos has explicitly stated that 
the EZLN were driven to armed action by hunger.  His claims are reinforced by 
Weinberg’s observation that the poverty of these parts of the forest has made these areas 
a fertile recruiting ground for the EZLN.89  This tension between the claims of the 
environmentalists and the needs of the poor is partly what makes the dispute so polarizing 
for the actors involved.  For example the World Wildlife Fund signed a petition in 2000 
calling for the removal of settlers which it later dropped due to attacks from the left, 
usually a traditional ally of conservation groups.  It now refuses to talk about the issue.90 
Yet whether the conflict is purely between the demands of the environment and 
the demands of peasants is not so certain.  It is worth considering the research of 
geographer Juanita Sundberg on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating 
within the Maya Biosphere Reserve, located in the Petén area of Guatemala.  Besides 
CI’s reports and criticisms of it from Zapatista partisans, there is scant information 
regarding how CI operates in the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve.  Even the Zapatistas 
themselves have not directly commented on CI’s work there so much as the actions of the 
government.  Due to the polarization of the issue, it seems unlikely that either side will 
prove to be entirely reliable in their accounts.  Sundberg’s writings on the other hand are 
useful for assessing the organization’s policies and attitudes towards conservation since 
CI is one of the NGOs operating in the reserve, and the Maya Biosphere Reserve’s 
situation is very similar to that of Montes Azules.  The Maya Biosphere Reserve was 
created in 1990 following the election of Guatemala’s first civilian President in fifteen 
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years, with approximately 1.6 million hectares in lowland forest devoted to it.91  
Between, 1970 and 1986 the forest cover of the Petén had shrunk by about twenty-five 
percent. 
This was accompanied by an ongoing expansion of the forest’s population from 
25,000 in the early 1960s to 300,000 in the mid 1990s. 92  The circumstances of this 
deforestation, immigration into the forest, appear to be similar to those of Montes Azules, 
particularly and about half of the reserve’s population are Maya.  Like the Lacandón, 
deforestation is brought about by a combination of logging, farming, cattle ranching, and 
oil exploitation.93  More than thirty NGOs are involved in the Reserve, including CI.  
Prior to 1990, the Petén forest’s integrity and use was regulated by the military who did 
not generally try to change livelihood practices.  The establishment of the reserve 
criminalized many traditional livelihood practices such as hunting, keeping certain 
animals as pets, and slash and burn agriculture.94  As such, the regulations of the park 
seem to differ little from those in Montes Azules. 
 In her research, Sundberg has observed that the biosphere reserve model tends to 
ignore local political settings.  This is because the organizations minding these reserves 
tend to view the landscape through a scientific viewpoint which seeks to examine the 
world according to a set of external, “non-human” values free of bias and value 
judgements.95  The result of this is that NGOs operating in the reserve tend to ignore and 
disrupt local cultural and social structures in order to promote leaders who favour their 
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policies.  Sundberg claims that this ends up dividing communities between those who use 
conservation rhetoric to undermine community norms and those who seek to uphold a 
particular community-oriented culture that does not reflect CI’s imposed conservation 
ethic.96  This critique is mirrored by the observations of anthropologist Charles Clark, 
who also examined the issue of deforestation and the Maya Biosphere Reserve.  Clark 
found that NGOs tend only to focus upon populations currently living within the reserve, 
but do not bother to address the concerns of those who might need land in the region.97  
In Guatemala’s case this need is extreme because of skewed concentrations of 
landholding which were exacerbated by authoritarian rule in the country from 1954 into 
the 1980s.98  Colonization of the Petén began in the 1970s as a result of the escalation of 
the civil war which forced many of the Q’echí Maya off of their land.99  In many ways 
the Guatemalan experience mirrors that of Chiapas in that land invasions were fuelled by 
both a lack of land elsewhere in the country and military repression. 
Both Sundberg and Clark’s criticisms of how the NGOs deal with conservation 
issues are also substantiated in the origins and effects of the earliest nature reserves.  
Yellowstone National Park, for example, was created after the American military had 
removed the Miwok people from their land in the Yosemite Valley.  In keeping with the 
establishment of the park, for more than a century Native American presence was only 
referenced in the park’s publications as being “early ‘visitors’” to Yellowstone100 even 
though the area had been inhabited by the Miwok shortly before to the park’s 
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establishment.  This revisionist history substantiates historian Roderik P. Neumann’s 
observation that nature parks are designed according to ideas that seek to remove all 
evidence of human agency from the land.101  He developed this explanation studying the 
history of Mount Meru National Park in Tanzania which was established by the English 
colonial government because of pressure from English conservationists.  The 
conservationists only permitted people to live within the forest of Mount Meru if they 
were considered to be a part of the park’s ‘fauna.’  This designation was based on popular 
Victorian stereotypes of “primitive” Africans who fit into the natural landscape.  As a 
result, the Pygmies residing within the boundaries of Albert National Park102  This is in 
keeping with Sundberg and Clark’s descriptions of how CI views the inhabitants of the 
park only in relation to how it sees the landscape of the park.  In all of the above 
instances, conservationists viewed the landscape as being ‘natural’ or ‘pristine’ in that it 
was free of human contact.  Yet in all of these cases – Yosemite, Mount Meru, and Petén 
– human activity had already shaped the environments that these conservationists wished 
to protect.  Therefore their attempts to severely restrict human activity actually threatened 
the environments they sought to preserve.  This chapter will consider these points when 
examining why CI has failed to cooperate with the EZLN. 
How these respective actors view their world is especially important because 
much of the situation is defined by the greatly divergent viewpoints of Conservation 
International and the EZLN.  The Zapatista National Liberation Army’s political 
perspective is shaped by a view of Mexican history which emphasizes rebellion and 
marginalization.  This view is defined by the opening statement of the First Declaration 
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of the Lacandon Jungle.  It reads: “We are a product of 500 years of struggle.”  The 
Zapatistas identify this struggle with historical events such as slavery, Mexico’s war for 
independence, foreign military incursions, and Porfirio Díaz’s dictatorship.103  In other 
words the Zapatistas see themselves as being a part of a continuous struggle against 
oppression.  Likewise the declaration refers to the PRI’s long hold on the government as 
a “70 year dictatorship,” which they then link to Mexico’s past by identifying the PRI 
with the same political establishments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that 
once opposed the rebel priest Hidalgo and later Emiliano Zapata.104  The most striking 
feature of this document is that it explicitly acknowledges the role that history plays in 
the Zapatistas’ view of Mexico’s political situation.  In the Fourth Declaration From the 
Lacandon Jungle the organization declares that “our fight is for history, and the evil 
government proposes to erase our history.”105  These statements suggest that the EZLN’s 
cause is as much about preserving a version of history which it favours – in this case a 
one of political rebellion - as it is about fighting oppression.  By following the line of 
thinking it becomes evident that the primary foundation of Zapatista identity is a history 
of rebellion in Mexico.  It is this historical perspective which dominates the Zapatistas’ 
understanding of the conflict in Montes Azules. 
This is also what makes Conservation International’s role in Montes Azules 
troublesome.  CI’s actions are not informed by a moral-historical perspective as the 
EZLN is, but by the scientific approach that was described earlier.  It states on its website 
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that its purpose is to address the threats to biodiversity across the world due to rising 
human populations and increasing resource demands of industrial nations.106  CI’s 
statements on its work in Mexico reflect this concern by detailing how the organization 
has established ecologically friendly enterprises such as shade-grown coffee that allow 
forest-dwellers to make a living without harming the environment.107  Yet, none of these 
examples is placed within the broader context of poverty in Chiapas and Mexico.  The 
reason for this seems to lie in the fact that Conservation International is a Washington 
D.C. based organization that is engaged in conservation efforts around the world.  As a 
result CI’s approach to Chiapas would not be shaped by the first hand experience of 
poverty, land reform, and political repression that have shaped the Zapatistas.  Instead, 
Sundberg claims that it leans on its technical, scientific perspective to obtain a “neutral” 
view of the situation.   This could explain why CI’s examples give no indication as to 
who has benefited from these projects and how they affect the overall political and 
economic situation in Chiapas; it is distanced by circumstance and by its values from the 
fractious situation within the reserve.  As such its primary concern is not reducing 
poverty so much as protecting the jungle.  CI recognizes to some extent that the invasion 
of the reserve by settlers was precipitated by the need for land.  Yet its 1995 report’s 
statements on the situation do not examine these issues at length.108  Furthermore, the 
report does not explain how land and the rebellion are linked, nor does that seem to be 
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CI’s primary concern as opposed to the damage these invasions are supposedly causing to 
the forest. 
In studying CI’s perspective on the jungle its descriptions of the land conflicts in 
the Lacandón Jungle are particularly telling in their vagueness.  In its 1995 annual report, 
CI mentioned that since early 1994 Tzeltal Mayan farmers had been entering the reserve 
in large numbers in search of land as a result of the Zapatista uprising.  In the process 
they settled on land held by the Lacandón Community, sparking a conflict between the 
two groups of Maya.  The organization’s report represents CI as having acted at the time 
to resolve the situation.  The report claimed that CI’s biological stations in the reserve 
provided “a conservation presence” and that it had worked with “all parties” to obtain a 
settlement for these land disputes.  Finally, the report stated that CI staffers had been 
working with people in the region to create new economic opportunities.109  CI said 
nothing else about the matter until its ten-year retrospective in its 1996 annual report.110  
In it, there was a section on cultural diversity which mentioned that CI’s staff had been 
working with the Tzeltal, Chol, and Lacandon Mayas and thus was in a position to 
negotiate with “all stakeholders” when pressure for land led to outright hostilities.111  
Nowhere, though, did it say what the results of CI’s involvement in negotiations were.  
Such an omission seems significant given that CI wishes to demonstrate how it can 
resolve ethnic tensions when conservation issues are at stake.  The organisation considers 
cultural diversity and biodiversity are inseparable and thus wishes to act as a mediator 
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between the settlers and the Lacandón.  Yet the absence of any description of the actual 
progress of this mediation seems odd given these goals.  This matter shall be addressed 
later within this thesis when I finally come to the matter of the current state of the conflict 
within the reserve. 
The differing focus of CI and the ELZN in regards to political developments in 
Chiapas is significant in light of the fact the Lacandón Maya land grant has been a major 
grievance on the part of many non-Lacandón communities living within the Lacandon 
jungle.  One such community, the Ricardo Flores Magón Autonomous Municipality, 
angrily denounced the concession in a 23 February 2003 letter.  The municipality claimed 
that over 60 communities with prior applications for land were living in the area at the 
time of the concession.  In the process the government had ignored over 1,500 Chol, 
Tojolabal, Tzotzil, and Tzeltal families who were already residing in the area.  It further 
alleged that the grant process was highly irregular since the time in between the 
Lacandón application and the Presidential decree had taken only eight months while 
claims that had been pending for over fifteen years were not answered.112  The 
municipality also complained that not only had the government ignored them for several 
years, but that it had only bothered to pay attention to them after their settlements were 
declared illegal.113  These complaints illustrate why the land in the rainforest has become 
so hotly contested by the Zapatistas since they feel that their prior claims to the land had 
been ignored by the government.  They also mirror the EZLN’s own grievances over the 
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Mexican federal government’s abandonment of agrarian reform, explaining why the 
EZLN sided with the outlawed settlements in this dispute. 
For the Zapatistas and their supporters the dispute over the reserve is tied up in 
their identity as indigenous Mexicans.  This identity primarily rests on how the Zapatistas 
conceive of indigenous rights within the political landscape of Mexico.  Up until the 
Third Declaration From the Lacandón Jungle the Zapatistas had primarily discussed 
rights strictly in regard to the rights of the Mexican people as a whole as defined by the 
original 1917 constitution.  However, by the time they released the Third Declaration in 
1995, they were claiming that their rebellion was driven by the need to call people’s 
attention to the plight of Mexico’s indigenous people.  The declaration said that the 
country’s problems could not be resolved without incorporating the indigenous people 
into the nation through respecting “their own social, political, and cultural 
organization.”114  In turn, this statement has been reflected in the EZLN’s frequent 
complaints that the government has continuously ignored or has been hostile to the needs 
and desires of Mexico’s indigenous population.115  These statements recall the effect that 
the government’s abandonment of land reform in the 1980s had on mobilizing the EZLN 
towards its 1994 rebellion, which was discussed in the first chapter.  Thus they should be 
taken as indicative of the effect that government policy has had on the political attitudes 
of the Zapatista base communities within the reserve.  
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This attitude appears to apply as much to Montes Azules as it does to the 
Constitution.  The Autonomous Muncipality of Ricardo Flores Magón, for example, has 
supported the ELZN and has been very outspoken on the matter of the reserve.  In a letter 
to the Mexican government dating back to the year 2000, the community stated that it 
would not bow to the government’s demand to relocate outside of the reserve because the 
land belongs to them by historic right.  It bases this assertion on the fact that its 
inhabitants had been legitimately applying for the lands under Mexico’s agrarian reform 
laws years prior to the establishment of the reserve.116  A Zapatista named Manuel voiced 
a similar argument.  According to him, his occupation of land in the Reserve was justified 
because it belonged to his ancestors.117  This is consistent with the Zapatistas’ view that 
the revisions to the constitution made in the late 1980s as discussed in Chapter One are 
illegitimate because they stripped away the agrarian reform provisions, thus ignoring 
their rights in the process.118  While these views largely seem to equate to advocacy for 
peasant rights, the EZLN and their supporters mostly seem to regard these rights as being 
specifically indigenous, especially since most of these remarks post-date the Third 
Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle.  For example, the Ricardo Flores Magón 
municipality says in its 2000 letter that it will defend its lands “as territories of our 
indigenous people.”  The municipality goes further to identify its inhabitants as Tseltales, 
Choles, Tojolabales, and Tzotiles, to whom they claim the land belongs by historic and 
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collective right.119  Subcommandante Marcos expressed a similar view in a 2004 letter in 
which he stated that the Zapatistas’ will defend the communities in Montes Azules as 
“the territories and rights of our indigenous peoples.”120  Given the emphasis placed on 
the historical/ethnic origins of the EZLN membership, it is likely that Manuel’s statement 
about his ancestors is representative of the EZLN’s emphasis on its historical roots and 
the indigenous heritage which it has claimed for itself. 
Conservation International, on the other hand, has sided with the Mexican 
government.  This alliance exists in spite its proclaimed position of neutrality as well as 
the government’s often violent opposition to the Zapatista communities.  There have been 
numerous allegations from the EZLN and their supporters that the Mexican Army is 
being used to intimidate and clear out settlers.  The Ricardo Flores Magón Municipality, 
among these, claims that the military encircled the Zapatista communities during the year 
2000.121  The same Municipality and Subcomandante Marcos also cited low overhead 
flights by helicopters from the Prosecutor General as proof of the military’s intent.122  
Those parts of the Mexican press that have sided with the movement have also implicated 
CI in these actions, by accusing it of providing the Mexican government with 
surveillance photographs of the communities in the reserve.123  CI does not deny that it 
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has been carrying out surveillance flights over the communities.  Instead, its official line 
is that these flights were carried out for the purpose of assessing habitat loss and deny 
that they have been pressuring the Mexican government to evict the communities.  
However, CI’s claim is seemingly contradicted by the Mexican Newspaper, La Jornada 
which reported in 2003 that Ignacio March, CI’s director in Chiapas, had admitted that 
the organization has pressed the government to evict the settlers.124  Though CI presents 
itself as being a neutral mediator in the conflict its work with the government hardly 
allows it to assume a position of neutrality.  This is especially the case given the hostility 
of the EZLN towards the government. 
The Zapatistas’ hostility towards the government has persisted even following the 
ousting of the PRI government by Vicente Fox in 2000.  On 19 July 2003, Marcos 
announced that the EZLN was formally suspending all contact with the Mexican 
government following what it called the failure of Mexican politicians to recognize the 
rights of indigenous people and an election campaign marked by high absenteeism.125  
However, this break seems to have begun in August 2001 when the Zapatistas rejected 
Constitutional reforms on the rights of indigenous people because certain provisions had 
been watered down in committee.126  Subcomandante Marcos condemned the changes as 
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denying the will of the people.127  As a result the reforms seem to have reinforced the 
Zapatistas’ longstanding grievance that the demands of Mexico’s indigenous people have 
been ignored. 
Considering these facts, Conservation International’s involvement in the region is 
hardly as neutral as CI makes it out to be.  Its ties to the Mexican government place it on 
one side of the conflict, substantiating Sundberg’s claim that ecological arguments can 
never be socially neutral since they are also socio-political arguments.128  In the case of 
Montes Azules it has taken the position that the settler populations are the main cause of 
deforestation because they are unfamiliar with the forest landscape and thus cannot 
properly care for it.  Yet, as pointed out earlier, a great deal of the illicit settlements 
predate the both the reserve and the formal demarcation of Lacandón and therefore would 
have had years to adapt to the landscape.  However, CI never mentions this fact.  As a 
result CI’s attempts to remain a detached observer do not actually provide it with a more 
accurate view of the reserve.  Instead it merely ignores the political and social context of 
the landscape and those facts that are inconvenient to its own pre-conceptions about 
deforestation. 
Meanwhile CI’s position on relocation directly threatens the EZLN which is 
based within the Lacandón jungle.  More than half of the irregular settlements are 
Zapatista base communities and are often located in places that CI has identified as high 
priority conservation spots.  For example, according to a map of the protected areas 
within the Jungle provided by CI, the Cañadas region, which has been a major Zapatista 
recruiting ground and contains the autonomous municipalities of 17 de Noviembre, 
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Primero de Enero, Eneresto Che Guevara, San Manuel, and Francisco Villa.  
Furthermore, Ricardo Flores Magón falls within one of the protected natural areas.129  
The latter community also mentions several more Zapatista communities within its 
territory affected by the Reserve’s borders.  These include Agua Azul, Chamizal, 
Emiliano Zapata, El Zapotal, San Antonio Escobar, San Felipe,  San Pedro, and Villa 
Rosas.  These communities also fall in areas listed by Conservation International as being 
high priority areas for conserving the environment.130  Given this situation it seems as 
though CI’s attempts to distance itself from the political landscape of the conflict merely 
hinder its efforts to act as a mediator since it supports a position that threatens one of the 
parties in the reserve. 
Judging from the statements released by the Ricardo Flores Magón municipality, 
Subcomandante Marcos, and news reports, CI’s intervention in 1994/1995 accomplished 
little in resolving the conflict, involving the population, or reaching its conservation 
goals.  In 10 April 2003 a group of Lacandones came to the community of Neuvo San 
Rafael and threatened the people there with expulsion.131  In 2005, La Jornada continued 
to run stories about the ongoing dispute in Montes Azules, such as the arrest of two 
Tzotiles who had returned to the reserve, as well as the eviction of one hundred and sixty 
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families from the reserve in February.132  Both Subcomandante Marcos and Zapatista 
communities have continued to denounce attempts to expel the settlers in the reserve.133 
CI’s own proclamations of its concern for cultural diversity are questionable 
given Ignacio March’s admission in May of 2002 that CI had pressured the federal 
government to evict the irregular communities in the reserve.134  Moreover, March 
himself said that the problem in the jungle was overpopulation and therefore the settlers, 
“’…can’t all be peasants’.”135  Similarly, CI’s head anthropologist, James Nations, stated 
in 2001, “This whole mythology of the Maya as the men of corn, that every Maya family 
has a genetic right to a piece of forest and a bag of seed corn -- that's a destructive 
attitude.”136  In effect Nations claimed that Mayan culture itself was the biggest threat to 
the reserve even though the organization he belongs to says that involving local 
populations in its conservation efforts and protecting cultural diversity is integral to its 
work.  The extent to which his sentiments reflect the actual attitudes of CI were revealed 
in the November/December 2004 issue of World Watch Magazine where his argument 
was featured in an article entitled “A Challenge to Conservationists,” which in addition to 
CI also looked at the attitudes of World Wildlife Federation and The Nature 
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Conservancy.  The article claimed that all three organizations were increasingly 
excluding indigenous people whom they had meant to include in their projects.  Most 
revealing was a CI biologist working in Brazil’s Lower Xingu region who told the 
article’s author, "Quite frankly, I don't care what the Indians want. We have to work to 
conserve the biodiversity."137 
These statements make it clear that CI does not necessarily regard local 
participation as key to its ecological goals, which explains its lack of attention to the 
politically explosive situation within the Montes Azules reserve.  Even though the reserve 
is situated in an area that underwent an armed uprising, CI has shown no actual signs of 
engaging the population that carried out the rebellion beyond the vague pronouncements 
of its reports.  Whatever CI’s proposed solutions for deforestation, in reality it seems 
entirely focused on removing the settlers.  It is worth taking a look at CI’s operations in 
the Maya Biosphere Reserve, which has experienced political conflicts over land and 
conservation similar to those in Montes Azules.  According to its reports from 1997, one 
of CI’s research stations was burnt down by farmers who wished to open up the Laguna 
del Tigre National Park in the Petén to milpa agriculture.  In the process the farmers also 
took some CI staffers hostage.  According to CI, the farmers demanded land and that CI 
abandon the reserve in exchange for the staffers’ release.  The organization responded by 
ignoring their demands and reporting the kidnapping to the authorities.  CI stated that the 
farmers gradually abandoned their demands upon seeing themselves portrayed as 
criminals in the Guatemalan media.  CI claims that it resolved the matter by sending in its 
Guatemala program director, Carlos Soza, to convince the farmers to side with CI.  Soza 
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apparently won them over by explaining how CI’s programs would benefit the 
inhabitants of the region.  CI ended its account of the incident by stating that while it had 
new allies in the region and that its station is operational once more, the pressure for land 
continues to grow.  As such, they claim that their sustainable economic development 
programs are more important than ever.138 
Nothing in this description matches up with Ignacio March or James Nations’ 
remarks or CI’s desire to relocate the settlers in Montes Azules.  It even admits that the 
situation is still unresolved despite the picture it paints of obtaining an easy solution to 
tensions between demands for land and its work in Guatemala.  The organization’s 
thinking seems to reflect the view that human activity is innately detrimental to ‘natural’ 
landscapes, a line of thought that reflects the treatment of resident populations in 
Yellowstone and Mount Meru.  Sundberg explains that, in attempting to remain 
distanced, NGOs’ neglect the broader reality of what affects the reserve and focus on 
single causes for deforestation, namely the peasant as a threat to nature.139  This approach 
falls more in line with older conservationist ideas that essentially defined the landscape 
by a set of aesthetic values, as opposed to social and political realities.  Moreover, its 
discourse frequently ignores the role that the government has played in the deforestation.  
For example, prior to the establishment of the reserve, the Guatemalan government 
sanctioned activities such as road building, cattle ranching, and logging within the forest.  
Yet CI never addresses these factors in its work in Guatemala.140  Similarly, its reports on 
Chiapas fail to discuss the Mexican government’s activities that have contributed to 
deforestation.  Moreover, none of its reports raise the question as to whether or not the 
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government’s economic policies have contributed to settlement in the reserve, which it 
alleges causes deforestation.  This is even though the Zapatistas have repeatedly 
identified government policies as responsible for their plight.  With these omissions in 
mind it seems as though CI is unable to effectively address the causes for deforestation in 
the reserve because the causes it identifies are so incredibly narrow, even within its 
claims of settler populations being the primary cause of deforestation within the reserve. 
The nature of the conflict between conservationists and settlers within the 
Lacandón jungle is defined by the inability of Conservation International to address the 
issues surrounding the reserve outside of the potential damage caused by settlers.  The 
nature reserve model assumes an apolitical approach to social and political problems 
because the model tries to project objectivity.  The EZLN are primarily concerned with 
seeing that their needs are addressed and that they have a substantive role in the decision 
making in the reserve, having put up with years of neglect from the government.  They 
believe that the establishment of the reserve is yet another example of the Mexican 
government ignoring the needs of indigenous Mexicans since it was established over the 
land claims of settlers who had been legally applying for land in the jungle years earlier.  
While CI claims that involving local populations in the decision-making process is 
integral to its conservation model its statements show a glaring absence of discussion on 
the dimensions of the conflict in the reserve.  None of its efforts at mediation or 
providing conservation alternatives seems to have had any beneficial impact on the 
situation.  In fact the individual statements of its staff indicate that CI is hostile to the 
settlers’ culture and sees it only as an impediment to its goals.  This would explain why 
they have pressured the Mexican government to evict the settlers, while ignoring the 
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government’s own role in deforestation.  As a result CI cannot address the EZLN’s stance 
on the reserve since it entirely rejects the question of indigenous rights.
 53
Chapter Three: Federal Policy and Zapatista Governance, the 
Conflict of Planning and Local Political Culture 
 The most serious axis of the conflict over the reserve is in the relationship 
between the settlers and the EZLN on one side, and the federal government of Mexico on 
the other.  In addition to longstanding grievances, the EZLN’s attitude towards the 
government is tempered by the PRI government’s use of violence against the rebellion, 
even after peace accords were signed.  However, the end of the PRI’s seventy-year rule in 
the 2000 election and the subsequent withdrawal of the military did not guarantee peace.  
When put before the Mexican congress, the peace accords’ proposals for indigenous 
government were watered down by legislators.  This caused the EZLN to break off 
relations with the new government and return to the jungle.  As a result, the Zapatistas 
remained hostile to the government. 
The EZLN’s dispute with the government is driven by the issue of land reform.  
And it is the matter of land reform that also fuels the dispute over the Lacandón jungle.  
Many of the proposals of the San Andrés Accords dealt with defining indigenous 
government and its control over resources.  It was these proposals which were watered-
down by the revisions made by the Mexican congress against the protests of the EZLN.  
Similarly, the government’s continued promotion of free market economics seems at 
odds with the EZLN’s desire for local control over economic matters.  Moreover, this 
policy also appears to be at odds with the government’s stated conservation goals.  Yet 
the EZLN has shown more concern for the integrity of the jungle than CI’s alarmist 
statements indicate.  With these matters in mind, the following chapter will examine how 
these issues relate to the Zapatistas’ attitudes towards the government’s involvement in 
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the jungle.  The EZLN’s stance in the reserve is clearly defined by the fact that it sees 
itself as defending the inviolable rights of Mexico’s indigenous people from the 
predations of a hostile government.  At the time same time, due to the government’s 
economic policies the organisation regards this goal as inseparable from the protecting 
the jungle. 
 By the time that they rose up on January 1st, 1994, the EZLN had been formed in 
a crucible of repression that was reinforced by the decision of the PRI government to use 
the army to crush the rebellion.141  The fighting raged until 12 January when the Mexican 
public came out in protest against the repression of the rebels.  By then the Lacandón 
Jungle was under rebel control.  At this point the government was forced to seek a 
diplomatic solution to the conflict.142  As soon as both parties agreed upon a mediation 
process, the PRI government withdrew some of the military forces on 21 December.  The 
EZLN declared a six day truce on 1 January 1995.143  Even at this early stage problems 
were arising with the peace process.  Prior to the withdrawal, Subcomandante Marcos 
wrote a letter on 3 December 1994 to the new president of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, 
denouncing the entire Mexican political system which had brought the new President to 
power.  Precisely why he sent such a hostile letter when the EZLN was still negotiating 
with the government is uncertain, but that he did so reveals how much the group already 
distrusted the government.  The letter claimed that Zedillo was “the personification of an 
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unjust system, antidemocratic, and criminal.”144  It also claimed that the government had 
breached the cease-fire agreement by replacing the soldiers it removed with police.145  
The truce broke down completely when the authorities reportedly found a Zapatista safe-
house in Mexico City as well as Zapatista weapons cache in Veracruz.  Zedillo responded 
by again rolling out the army, as well as issuing an arrest warrant for Marcos and other 
alleged Zapatista leaders.146  However, this incited a demonstration by tens of thousands 
of protestors in Mexico City147 again saving the Zapatistas from the army.  By now the 
government had already thrown its interest in the peace process into doubt and shown 
that the EZLN could not depend on its goodwill. 
 In 1996 the two parties negotiated the San Andrés Accords.  The Accords were 
reached by EZLN representatives and the Commission of Concord and Pacification 
(COCOPA), a team of legislators from Mexico’s three largest political parties: the PRI, 
the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).148  
The final version of the Accords appeared in February 1996 and consisted of three 
documents endorsed by the rebels and the federal government.  These documents 
included a joint declaration of principles for a new relationship between the Mexican 
State and Mexico’s indigenous peoples.  The declaration was followed by a set of 
proposals based on these principles as well as a set of commitments to Chiapas made by 
the rebels, the state government, and the federal government.149 
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 All three declarations had set out to address the historical inequality of Mexico’s 
indigenous people and strengthen their participation in political and economic decision-
making.150  While they touched upon matters such as the rights of indigenous women, 
education, and rights to mechanisms of communication such as television stations, the 
Accords’ points on self governance, autonomy, environmental sustainability, economic 
policy, and lands are of primary concern given their bearing on the dispute in Montes 
Azules.  The accords define the concept of “autonomy” as it applies to indigenous people 
as them being free to decide their own forms of “internal governance” and how they 
choose to organize themselves in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres.151  
This reflects demands made by the EZLN during a February 1994 dialogue to end 
centralization of the state and allow indigenous communities to govern with political, 
economic, and cultural autonomy.152  Moreover, the documents also recognize that this 
autonomy means, “autonomy as collectives with different cultures,” and that it should be 
enshrined in national law.153  As a part of implementing these ideas, the authorities were 
to oversee the transfer of resources to the local level, which would have given indigenous 
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communities a greater say in how public funds are administered in their area.154  
Furthermore, the accords stated that the entire area of land which indigenous people 
occupy or use is “the material basis for their reproduction,”155 thus defining possession 
and control of land as essential to Mexico’s indigenous people.  The proposal also 
mentions that indemnification will be paid to those communities whose natural resources 
have been damaged by state exploitation.156 
It is not hard to see how these points reflect the EZLN’s grievances over land.  
The accords recognize both the EZLN’s stated need for and right to land while taking 
steps to alleviate the dependence on the federal government’s resources that was 
discussed in Chapter One.  The only caveat is that those resources which fall under the 
direct control of the nation shall not be subject to this transfer157 which seems to 
undermine the EZLN’s position in Montes Azules.  However, the EZLN did not object to 
this point.  It accepted the accords, but objected to a lack of a solution for the issue of 
Article 27 of the Constitution.  It also felt that the compensation for damage to natural 
resources in indigenous territories was insufficient.  The EZLN said it was necessary “to 
develop a policy of true sustainability that preserves the lands, territories, and natural 
resource of indigenous peoples, in short, takes into account the social costs of 
development projects.”158  The organisation also requested that there be a specific 
timeline for implementing the accords as well as explicit commitments from the 
government for access to “adequate infrastructure,” training, and “economic 
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resources.”159  The importance of these ideas to the EZLN is found not only in how the 
organization accepted them, but, as Bill Weinberg points out, their being “based on a 
system of parallel power which already existed in Chiapas.”160  As such, the EZLN 
support for these points is based on the fact that implementing the Accords would 
legalize the systems of government and economic organization which if favoured. 
However, President Zedillo never implemented the accords and instead increased 
military pressure on the Zapatistas.  A year after the negotiations, the EZLN sent out a 
letter denouncing the federal government for failing to keep its word.  It contained the 
phrase, “Power once again applies a military solution,”161 reaffirming the Zapatistas’ 
cynicism of the Mexican political establishment.  The EZLN saw the government as the 
root of all violence in Chiapas, blaming the infamous massacre of 45 EZLN supporters in 
the town of Acteal on the government.162  Eventually overtures towards peace were made 
by Chiapas’ governor at the time while the military withdrew from the EZLN stronghold 
of La Realidad in 1998.  Nothing materialized out of these offers and the peace process 
was stalled until 2000, when the Partido Revolucionaria Institucional was finally ejected 
from public office by the victory of the National Action Party’s (Partido Acción Naciónal 
- PAN) candidate, Vicente Fox.  In February 2001, the EZLN began to march to the 
capital to negotiate with the Mexican congress to seek approval of the Accords.163 
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Though it seemed that the new presidency had at least spurred some new 
movement in the peace process, it was obvious that the EZLN was still cautious about the 
new government.  The Zapatistas stated they were not coming to Mexico City to 
negotiate with the government and would not do so unless Fox fulfilled three conditions: 
withdraw the military from Chiapas, release all Zapatista prisoners, and fulfill the San 
Andrés Accords by putting COCOPA’s proposals into law.164  Fox withdrew the military, 
which was out of the jungle by April, and released several Zapatista prisoners.165  Yet 
passing the accords into law was not as easy since COCOPA’s proposals were criticized 
by many legislators, particularly former ministers of Ernesto Zedillo.  Their attitude was 
summed up by former agrarian minister Arturo Warman who stated that the proposed law 
would lead to legal confrontations between ethnic groups seeking to use the law’s legal 
ambiguities against each other.  Furthermore, he argued that certain provisions would be 
used against minorities within indigenous communities.166  When the law was finally 
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passed, law makers had excised the article which stated that communities would agree on 
the use of natural resources “in a collective manner” and removed the designation of 
indigenous territories as the totality of the lands that the indigenous occupy and use.  
Moreover, their use was limited to the “modalities and limitations established for 
property in the constitution.”  In regard to exercising autonomy, the revised law 
completely deleted a section that recognized that indigenous communities were free to 
associate in order to coordinate their actions.167  Of the major parties, only the PRD 
opposed these changes.168  The EZLN responded by denouncing the changes as a betrayal 
of the accords and as avoiding a resolution of the causes of the uprising.  They then 
promptly broke off contact with the government.169 
The failure to pass the original COCOPA proposals into law has left the peace 
process unresolved.  When it broke off contact with the government, the EZLN stated 
that the changes would perpetuate the conditions that “give reason for being to different 
armed groups in Mexico,” and thus the Zapatista Army would continue its “resistance 
and rebellion.”  Even with their call to civil society for non-violent resistance170 these 
words make it clear that the ELZN still regards itself as engaged in rebellion against the 
government, a position justified in the EZLN’s view by a long litany of government and 
military atrocities.  The Ricardo Flores Magón Autonomous Municipality’s 23 February 
                                                
167  EZLN, N.D., “Cuadro Comparativo de la Iniciativa de la Cocopa y el Dictamen de ley Indígena,” < 
htttp://www.ezln.org/san_andres/cuadro010430.html > (23 August 2005);  Fabiola Guaneros, Alejandro 
Torres and Guillermina Guillén, 26 April 2001, “Aprueba Senado ley indígena,” 
<http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/web_histo_primera.despliega?var=5575&var_sub_actual=-
&var_fecha=26-ABR-01> (23 July 2005). 
168 Jorge Herrera y Jorge Teherán, 28 April 2001, “Aprobarán PRI y AN ley indígena,” 
<http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/web_histo_primera.despliega?var=5596&var_sub_actual=-
&var_fecha=28-ABR-01> (23 July 2001). 
169 Fredy Martín Pérez, 01 May 2001, “Rompe EZLN con diálogo con Fox,” 
<http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/web_histo_primera.despliega?var=5625&var_sub_actual=-
&var_fecha=01-MAY-01> (23 July 2005). 
170 Subcomandante Marcos, 29 April 2001, “La reform aprobada traiciona los acuerdos de San Andrés: 
EZLN,” <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/may01/010501/ezln.html> (26 July 2005). 
 61
2003 letter, for example, reads like a catalogue of every act of violence committed 
against every indigenous group that has lived in the Lacandón jungle.171  The EZLN 
consistently refers to the government as “the bad government” and accuses it of 
conducting a “war of extermination.”  It also mentions the San Andrés Accords and how 
the government “betrayed” the accords by modifying many of their points.172 
The Zapatistas’ stance on the law comes from the land issue which led to the 
uprising in the first place.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Lacandón Jungle had been 
used by the Mexican government in the 1970s to divert pressure for land redistribution 
away from wealthy estates.  Thousands of settlers had already moved into the area before 
the government effectively outlawed much of the settlements by signing the land over to 
the Lacandón Maya in 1972, and once more in 1978 with the establishment of the Montes 
Azules Biosphere Reserve.  The establishment of these protected areas are the central 
grievance of the Ricardo Flores Magón Autonomous Municipality, which claims that 
both land concessions have infringed upon several communities’ ejidal rights under 
Article 27 of the Constitution, especially given that thirty percent of Montes Azules falls 
outside of the jungle area.173  It is clear that the municipality regards the reserves in the 
same light as the revision of Article 27 in the 1980s: an abandonment of Mexico’s 
indigenous people by the government.  Both the Municipality and Subcomandante 
Marcos have made it clear that they regard access to land as stipulated in the original 
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version of Article 27 in the Constitution as a historic and fundamental right of Mexico’s 
indigenous people.174 
Congress’ changes to the original COCAPA proposals have undermined many of 
the EZLN’s political goals and reinforced its stance on indigenous rights, specifically the 
desire for collective decision-making over the use of natural resources.  One of the 
deleted sections, for example, stated that the communities would decide in a collective 
fashion on how to use their natural resources.  Removing this, and the original definition 
of indigenous territories – replacing it with lands where the majority of the populace is 
indigenous rather than those lands inhabited and used by indigenous people – further 
obscured those goals within the law.175  These goals were evident at the outset of the 
rebellion when the EZLN issued a series of “Revolutionary Laws” which included an 
agrarian law that provided for the expropriation of large land-holdings, their 
redistribution among poor campesinos, and the re-orientation of these lands towards 
producing foodstuffs. 176  Clearly the EZLN was trying to re-establish collective, local 
control over land resources in the wake of the rebellion.  However, the changes to the 
original COCOPA proposals undermined this goal.  Thus, these revisions were seen by 
the Zapatistas as an infringement on their agrarian rights.  Their determination to see 
these provisions carried out was made clear when the organization chose to unilaterally 
implement the accords in the form of autonomous governments in Zapatista controlled 
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lands, regardless of the legal standing of these actions.177  The most telling aspect of this 
action was that though the government hailed the move as a positive development and 
said that it was constitutional, EZLN Comandante Esther said the government was trying 
to force them to give up their indigenous rights “to be recognized as Mexicans,”178 
highlighting the level of enmity this dispute has fostered. 
The EZLN’s objection to the government’s conservation policies in the jungle 
seems to stem from the organisation’s belief that indigenous people have a right to 
control the land that they live on and the resources that come with it.  Given its various 
statements on the matter it appears as though the EZLN backs self-government as a 
method of ensuring indigenous rights and freedom against a hostile and neglectful state.  
This idea was most explicitly expressed in the Fifth Declaration From the Lacandón 
Jungle, written in 1998 when the organization was still facing off against Zedillo.  The 
Declaration stated that any constitutional reform on indigenous rights must incorporate 
the San Andrés Accords in order to recognize the fundamental demands of the Indian 
people.179  It also rejected any legislation which sought to limit indigenous rights to the 
local level on the basis that doing so would be an attempt to fragment Mexico’s 
indigenous peoples and thus pave the way for their annihilation.  It reasoned then that 
such legislation could not assure peace.180  This statement ties in with the rejection of the 
modified COCOPA law since the provisions for allowing indigenous communities to 
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coordinate their actions, which the EZLN regards as necessary for resisting further 
violence from the government, had been deleted.  Its objection also rests on the idea that 
such limits attempt to break “the bonds of historical and cultural solidarity which exist 
among the indigenous.”181 
Yet while these issues are critical to the EZLN, this focus on indigenous rights 
may be too limiting in understanding their insistence on adopting the original accords in 
regard to the Lacandón.  The EZLN has always maintained that it and the settlers having 
been taking care of the jungle’s integrity.  The Ricardo Flores Magón municipality says 
that the Accords “were created for protecting natural resources and rationally exploiting 
natural resources in a collective manner,” a statement that both closely mirrors the 
EZLN’s collectivist politics and reflects Marcos’ claim that the EZLN has been trying to 
protect the forest. 182  Moreover, the Municipality’s characterization of the accords as 
establishing a system for protecting and “rationally exploiting” natural resources suggests 
that both local control over resources and conservation are regarded as inseparable by the 
Zapatistas.  A letter from Marcos to a Mexican newspaper columnist in March 2001 
rebuked claims that the rebels were destroying the forest by pointing out that the 
Zapatista army has laws against felling or burning trees in the forest which the 
communities are responsible for enforcing.  Furthermore, he says that settlers have 
changed patterns of sowing to accommodate the forest and have set up a communication 
system for signalling the spread of fires so that they can be stopped.183  A Zapatista 
commander named Jaime referred to similar laws while being interviewed by the press 
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though he admitted that they were difficult to enforce.  His admission is seemingly 
supported by the numerous conservationists who have found signs of deforestation 
around settlements.184 
But, as discussed earlier, conservation groups have shown a marked tendency to 
fixate on settler populations as the singular cause for deforestation while ignoring other 
causes.  Much of Marcos’ letter about the jungle is devoted to rebuking military actions 
in the region, describing examples of the military terrorizing indigenous communities and 
felling trees.185  Moreover, many social justice groups outside of the reserve have sided 
with the Zapatistas on this issue.  Activist Aziz Choudry, for example, reported that a 
2003 Global Exchange delegation to the area found that there was more destruction 
around military encampments than the settler communities.  Meanwhile, many of the 
indigenous communities accused of destroying the jungle had outlawed slash-and-burn 
agriculture and had turned to more sustainable forms of cultivation.186  Others have also 
observed that while the government has sided with CI’s position, it has tolerated small 
scale logging concessions given out by municipalities.187 
This information, implicating the government in the destruction of the reserve, 
raises questions as to the veracity of CI’s claims and the consistency of the government in 
protecting the forest.  Most of the government’s critics have pointed to its economic 
policies when questioning the consistency of its conservation efforts inside the jungle.  At 
the same time, Choudry and other supporters of the Zapatista position have failed to 
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provide more detailed information that fully supports their claims and refute those made 
by CI.  However, the Mexican government’s economic policies are well worth examining 
in this case.  As covered in Chapter One, in the 1980s the Mexican government began 
abandoning the policy of corporatism that had been in place since the revolution in favour 
of liberal economics.  This entailed abandoning land reform during the Presidency of 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, an act that the EZLN cites as the primary reason for its 
rebellion.  Little has changed with the ousting of the PRI.  Vicente Fox has voiced his 
support for NAFTA and the recent Central American Free Trade Agreement, even 
rejecting pleas by farmers to review NAFTA’s effects on Mexico, arguing that the treaty 
had been beneficial for Mexicans as a whole.188  As such the EZLN are as critical of his 
economic policy as they were of the PRI’s, particularly as they apply to both the jungle 
and Fox’s new development plan for Mexico – the Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP.)  
According to the Inter-American Development Bank’s website, the PPP is a development 
plan for Central America and Southern Mexico that involves improving infrastructure, 
reducing poverty in the region, reducing vulnerability to natural disasters, and increasing 
trade between the countries.189  The PPP tends to be vague on exactly how these goals 
will be accomplished but certain aspects suggest that it is oriented towards the kind of 
liberal economics espoused by various administrations in the past twenty years. 
                                                
188 Agencia, 8 August 2005, “Exhorta Fox a Aprovechar TLC con Centro ameríca,” 
<http://www.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/mexico/352539.html> (8 August 2005); BBC World Service, 7 
January 2003, “Mexican Farmers’ Trade Plea Rejected,” 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2633749.stm> (8 August 2003). 
189 Interamerican Development Bank (IABD), N.D., “Objectivos,” 
<http:///www.iabd.org/PPP/pppobjectives.asp> (9 August 2005). 
 67
“Economic integration” for example refers to the removal of trade barriers such as 
tariffs.190  A description of Salinas’ presidency notes that liberalizing trade was among 
the many measures it took alongside privatizing state-owned firms and deregulation.191  
In keeping with this theme, the Report of the Commission of Finance for the PPP states 
that one of the project’s goals is to reduce the cost and time required to carry out cross 
border transactions, a goal that is given its own specific policy initiative: the 
“Mesoamerican Initiative for the Facilitation of Commercial Exchange.”  In the spirit of 
this, there also exists a plan for integrating road systems in Central America for the 
purpose of facilitating the flow of merchandise.192  According to one of the documents on 
the PPP, one of its goals is to exploit the potential found in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement.193  Among all these initiatives the PPP does have an indigenous 
component.   The Mexican government’s website states that among the Plan’s goals are 
incorporating indigenous views into development as well as creating structures and 
procedures that will allow for their representation.194  As a result, the Plan was even 
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endorsed in June 2002 by the Indigenous Council of Central America (CICA) after 
participating in discussions on the plan.195 
It is not surprising though that this has not won over the EZLN.  Marcos, for 
example, called the PPP a “separatist project” designed to fragment the country and turn 
Mexico’s southeast into a repository from which to extract natural resources.196   The 
Ricardo Flores Magón Autonomous Municipality mirrored this criticism, saying that the 
PPP was created in order to bring neo-liberal economic policies to the south of Mexico as 
well as Central America.  The community also charges that the government was trying to 
clear indigenous communities out of the region in order to accomplish these goals.197  
The references to neo-liberalism easily explain their attitudes towards the plan.  Even 
though it was ostensibly designed to incorporate indigenous viewpoints, the PPP was still 
designed by the federal government to promote an economic agenda to which the 
Zapatistas have long been opposed.  The Zapatista attitude is best explained in Marcos’ 
1992 pre-uprising appraisal of Mexico, “A Storm and a Prophecy.”  It points out that 
Chiapas is naturally wealthy but loses a great deal of its wealth through resource 
extraction industries.198  These include, among other things, ninety-two thousand barrel 
of petroleum produced each day and one-hundred thousand tons of coffee each year.199  
In stark contrast to these exports, the essay states that coffee producers are paid a mere 
two-thousand and five hundred pesos.  Moreover, two thirds of municipalities do not 
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have paved roads and the state has the highest mortality rate in Mexico, much of it 
attributed to curable diseases from a lack of health care.200  This is particularly telling 
since while the EZLN has often complained about the government’s violent intrusions, it 
also seems to be aggrieved by their neglect as seen in the lack of basic amenities in 
Chiapas.  The essay’s indictment of the system is summed up by the statement, “This is 
what capitalism leaves as payment for everything that it takes away,”201 which also 
summarizes the attitudes of Zapatistas. 
These attitudes are reflected in the Zapatistas’ views on the Lacandón Jungle.  In 
“A Storm and a Prophecy,” Marcos described how campesinos in the towns of Betania 
and Marques de Comillas who cut wood for fire were harassed and arrested by 
government agents who often confiscated the wood for their own uses.202  Marcos’ 
observations are backed up by the research of June Nash.  Nash notes that in Marques de 
Comillas the campesinos were allowed to cut down trees to clear space for their crops, 
but they could not sell the wood.  However, government trucks came and loaded up the 
wood to carry it to market, a practice which spurred a protest in 1991.203  Marcos’ 
description of this event and the 1991 protest provides a glimpse into settlers and the 
EZLN’s view of the hypocrisy of the government in both the peace process and the 
dispute over the jungle.  Despite siding with conservation organizations, the government 
allows the very activities that those organizations decry.  It should be noted that even 
after the government established the reserve it was signing logging deals with many of 
the Lacandón Indians and building roads into the jungle, with the Lacandón Indians 
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frequently receiving meagre compensation.204  Moreover, the government had plans for a 
hydroelectric dam along the Usumacinta River in the jungle which was only cancelled in 
2003, while the Chiapas social group – the Centre of Economic and Political 
Investigations of Community Action – has noted other such planned projects in the 
region including one located on the Santo Domingo River which would flood the 
Zapatista community of Tierra y Libertad.205  Under such circumstances the EZLN’s 
resistance to relocation and insistence on a locally controlled form of conservation 
become clearer.  The authorities have not lived up to their environmental commitments 
any more than they have addressed the needs of Chiapas’ indigenous population.  As a 
result the EZLN and its base communities have decided to address this issue the same 
way they have addressed indigenous rights.  They have chosen to take control of the 
matter into their own hands. 
In light of this, how the Mexican government’s economic plans apply to the 
Lacandón Jungle should be examined.  According to the Ricardo Flores Magón 
Autonomous Municipality, the head of the Federal Environmental Protection 
Prosecutor’s Office (PROFEPA) said that if they “don’t put these areas of great national 
wealth into order, private enterprise will never invest in them.”206  He also said that the 
reserve would be opened to the army in order to “eliminate the organized crime that is 
concealed there,” and guarantee security for private business in the process.  Supposedly 
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these statements were seconded by the Secretary of the Environment and Natural 
Resources (SEMARNAT), the Agrarian Prosecutor, and the Secretary of Social 
Development.207  According to SEMARNAT’s website, in 2001 PROFEPA organized 
455 security operations collaborating with the Federal Police Force, the Federal Attorney 
General, security forces, and the Mexican Army.208 
Given the continuity between the PRI and the PAN’s economic policies and their 
track record in the jungle, the Zapatistas’ suspicion is understandable.  Marcelo Antinori, 
an official at the Inter-American Development Bank, once defended the PPP stating that 
it was a myth that the program was dreamed up in Washington which “admits neither 
debate nor change.”  In fact, he claimed, “the plan is owned by the Mesoamerican nations 
and it will be whatever they want it to be.”209  However, the plan might as well have been 
dreamed up in Washington as far as the Zapatistas are concerned.  As researcher Laura 
Carlsen points out, the plan’s goals were already defined before the indigenous 
participation component was included; the latter was only added to the plan in 1999 after 
much protest from communities.210  It is unlikely that the Plan could be accepted by the 
Zapatistas, who already regard the government as disinterested in their needs and 
concerns, since its participatory component is merely an afterthought tacked on to help 
obtain the goals of national policy makers. 
The government’s hypocrisy over preserving the jungle partly explains why the 
EZLN insist on overseeing the jungle’s conservation.  Moreover, many of the 
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communities that support the EZLN are more experienced with the landscape of the 
Lacandón than CI alleges.  Taken in concert with the state’s failure to handle this matter, 
the EZLN maintains its distance from the government and sees to matters such as 
economic organization and conservation independent of any Washington or Mexico City 
based policy. 
The conflict over the government’s conservation efforts in the Lacandón Jungle is 
as much over the political autonomy and indigenous rights as it is conservation.  In this 
case, the Zapatistas’ feel that indigenous rights and conservation are inseparable due to 
their experience with the government’s economic policies and response to dissent.  The 
attitude of the Zapatistas has been shaped by continued state violence after the 
government had signed the San Andrés Peace Accords but refused to respect them.  Even 
after the defeat of the PRI and the withdrawal of the military from Chiapas, the peace 
process was once more broken apart when legislators changed the Accords’ provisions 
regarding autonomous indigenous government.  This made the EZLN as hostile to the 
Fox government as it had been to the PRI.   It regarded accepting the new law as 
undermining the rights of indigenous people, including the forms of government that it 
had created to resist repression and the structures that it has used to preserve the jungle.  
Despite CI’s claims, many Zapatista communities have lived in the jungle for decades.  
Many of these communities have also adopted sustainable agriculture.  Moreover, the 
Zapatistas have been terrorized by an army that has felled trees and are aggrieved by the 
fact that the government dictates conservation policy while it has been inconsistent at 
best in maintaining it.  The continuity between the economic policies of the governments 
of the PRI and Vicente Fox feed into this issue by highlighting these inconsistencies.  
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Fox’s government has continued to follow the neoliberal economic policies of the PRI.  
This includes an infrastructure development plan for the Mexican Southeast (and Central 
America) called the Plan Puebla Panamá.  The Zapatistas have cited it as proof of the 
Mexican government’s continuing adherence to policies designed to deprive them of any 
political power or rights. While the PPP is ostensibly committed to involving indigenous 
people, its goals had been defined before consulting them.  Furthermore, the PPP reflects 
ideas the EZLN had long since rejected.  At the same time the plan proposes building 
roads and hydro-electric dams in the very area that Conservation International claims is 
threatened by human activity.  As a result the EZLN continues to exert local political 
autonomy to protect both its rights and the forest. 
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Chapter Four: The Zapatistas and the Lacandón, 
Indigenous Identity in the Conflict Over Land 
 
 So far this thesis has concerned itself with the dispute in Montes Azules as it 
pertains to the Zapatistas’ relationship to Conservation International and the Mexican 
government.  These last two groups’ have not accepted the concept of indigenous rights 
as held by the Zapatistas National Liberation Army nor how this has defined the EZLN’s 
implacable stance on the jungle.  At the same time these ideas have also become the 
standards by which the Zapatista rank-and-file judge other indigenous groups.  The bitter 
enmity that marks the dispute over Montes Azules is not only directed towards 
conservationists and the government, but also to the Lacandón Maya who have sided with 
the government in order to protect the reserve from invasions by settlers.  In order to 
understand this matter the roots of the EZLN’s ideas about indigenous identity must be 
discussed further. 
For the EZLN, being indigenous is based less upon cultural signifiers like 
language or religion than on political-historical assumptions about the experiences of 
indigenous Mexicans.  These assumptions seem to be based on the Zapatistas’ own 
experiences and as a consequence the EZLN has ignored those indigenous groups that 
oppose it.  Among such groups is the Lacandón Maya, an indigenous group that has 
resided in and around the reserve since its establishment.  There has been much hostility 
between this group and Zapatista settlers.  The conflict between the two can partly be 
attributed to the policies of CI and the Mexican government in the Montes Azules 
Biosphere Reserve which have refused to address the issues which drive settlement in the 
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jungle.  With this in mind, it becomes clear that the EZLN’s ideas about being indigenous 
are greatly limited by the fact that these ideas are largely defined by its political conflict 
with the government. 
As covered in the first chapter, the EZLN initially presented itself as a pro-
democracy movement that sought to oust the PRI from government.  It eventually came 
to portray itself as an indigenous movement that was concerned with promoting 
democracy and indigenous rights in Mexico.  Despite the change of its public face, the 
organization’s indigenous character has been a part of the EZLN since its inception.  
References to it appear in the earliest interviews with the EZLN’s leaders, such as a 
January 1994 interview with Subcomandante Marcos in La Jornada.  In it, the interviewer 
addresses the EZLN with the statement “Compañeros of Chiapas, Indians… if you were 
brought tortillas, water, pozolito, would you accept it?”211  What is significant is that the 
interviewer addresses the group not only with the friendly “compañeros” but as Indians.  
This is reinforced by a joint interview with several members of the Indigenous 
Clandestine Revolutionary Committee, where a Comandante named Isaac claimed that 
the EZLN would not be quick to trust the government’s peace overtures considering the 
injustices it had heaped on them “as Indigenous peoples, campesino peoples, and working 
peoples.”212  This statement acknowledges the EZLN’s indigenous background though it 
is placed alongside other facets of the groups’ identity.  As early as May 1994 Marcos 
described the EZLN as an indigenous movement, such as when he said that its growth 
was due to the fact that “indigenous peoples realized the necessity of learning to defend 
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themselves.”213  By 1999, Marcos said in a letter to Mumia Abu-Jamal that “We are 
Mexican and mostly indigenous.”214 
Given the group’s origins it is highly unlikely that its focus on its indigenous 
identity was only an innovation that followed the rebellion.  The overwhelming majority 
of its members and general command are indigenous.   While its origins lie partly in a 
group of Maoist urban guerrillas who travelled to the jungle to promote revolution, the 
guerrillas only took root among the jungle’s indigenous communities because they were 
welcomed by the communities’ leaders who had grown exasperated at the failure of 
political protest in the face of military repression.215   According to Marcos, the group 
initially had a political and military structure similar to most other guerrilla movements in 
Latin America during the sixties and seventies.  Moreover, its objective was to overthrow 
the national government, take power, and was concerned with “ideological and physical 
strength” of the organization.216  Marcos has at times claimed that this system of 
indigenous self-government always existed, but on other occasions he has argued that it 
was created out of necessity in response to state neglect.217  Whatever version is the most 
accurate, the importance of this system of self-government helps to explain the group’s 
insistence that San Andrés be adopted in its original form, since many of its points 
involved providing legal backing and material support for this system.  Most importantly, 
Marcos claims that the original vertical structure of the EZLN was phased out as more 
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indigenous people began to join the organisation, and the EZLN found that it could not 
accomplish anything without the approval of its popular base.218 
The EZLN also regards indigenous identity as rooted in the land itself.  In his 
letter to Mumia Abu Jamal, Marcos said that the government only saw business in the 
land whereas the indigenous Zapatistas “see our history written in these lands.”219  This 
theme crops up again when he describes how the Zapatistas are “‘people of colour’,” who 
are brown like the earth.220  These statements come out of Mayan creation mythology.  In 
it, the first men and women were created from corn by the gods.221  According to the 
myth, after creating humanity, the gods told them where the world was located and why.  
By claiming that the Maya possess a special spiritual truth handed down to them by the 
divine which has been threatened by the political establishment in Mexico, Marcos gives 
the EZLN’s struggle to preserve an indigenous way of life a religious significance.222 
These remarks seem to shine a light on some of the assumptions implicit in 
Zapatismo.  One of these is the belief that the EZLN’s vision of indigenous identity is 
shared by all indigenous people in Mexico.  In the Third Declaration From the Lacandón 
Jungle, the EZLN declares that the only way to properly incorporate Mexico’s indigenous 
population into the nation is to recognize “the characteristics of their own social, 
political, and cultural organization.  Autonomy is not separation; it is integration of the 
most humble and forgotten minorities in Mexico.”223  The Fifth Declaration carries this 
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theme further when it states that the Accords were not only the product of the EZLN’s 
demands, but also a product of those demands made by representatives of Mexico’s 
indigenous people.  According to the Declaration, by failing to accept the Accords and 
turning military pressure on the EZLN, Zedillo’s government had declared war not only 
on the organization, but on all indigenous people as well.224  These points are consistently 
re-emphasized throughout the document so as to give the impression that the EZLN’s 
struggle is that of all Mexico’s indigenous peoples, an idea made explicit by the 
statement that Zapatistas stand “next to and behind the Indian peoples”225 
While there is some basis for this assumption, the situation is not necessarily as 
simple as the EZLN makes it out to be.  In support of its view, the revised indigenous law 
passed by Congress in April of 2003 was rejected by fourteen of Mexico’s thirty-one 
states when it was sent out to them for ratification.  Those fourteen states had the highest 
proportion of indigenous people in the country.226  Moreover, the National Indigenous 
Congress rejected the law due to the changes made by congress and claimed that not only 
did it not represent the agreement signed between the government and the EZLN, but that 
it legitimized a strategy of ethnocide.227  This sentiment echoes those of the Fifth 
Declaration From the Lacandon Jungle regarding law and indigenous solidarity.  
However, in spite of these facts there are others which contradict the EZLN’s claim. 
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For starters, the EZLN’s 1994 uprising was not supported by all of Chiapas’ 
indigenous communities.  While travelling through the highlands, researchers George A. 
Collier and Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello discovered that there were many communities 
who had opposed the uprising from its outset.  For example, some Tzotzils in the region 
referred to the Zapatistas as “troublemakers” or “bandits,” which in the context of the 
region’s history serve as explicit references to the banditry that plagued the countryside 
during the Mexican Revolution.228  Others in the communities of Chamula and 
Zinacantán invoked Mayan mythology in disparaging the Zapatistas.  They claimed that 
the organization’s recruitment drive in the mountains was blocked by two ancestor 
deities: a giant snake and whirlwind.  It is important to note that these communities had 
remained loyal to the PRI during the 1994 rebellion229 which undermines the EZLN’s 
claims in the Fifth Declaration that it stands alongside all of Mexico’s indigenous people.  
More recently, in 2004 there was an incident near Zinacantán where a number of 
Zapatista supporters were ejected from a nearby settlement when the community cut off 
their water service.  The Zapatistas had come to the village to drum up support for the 
EZLN’s cause, but residents complained that they had not contributed money to the 
area’s water system.  The Zapatistas for their part claimed that they were attacked 
because the villagers, who at this point were now loyal to the PRD, took umbrage with 
their campaigning for the EZLN.230  What makes this event striking is that the PRD was 
the only major political party to oppose the changes to the indigenous law in 2003, yet its 
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supporters in one indigenous village were not necessarily pre deposed towards supporting 
the EZLN itself. 
Another significant facet of this matter is the socio-economic inequality that the 
EZLN rails against is partly due to stratification within indigenous communities.  Collier 
and Quaratiello have observed that following the 1994 uprising people have been prone 
to idealizing indigenous peasants while ignoring the economic inequalities that exist 
among them.231  To cite one example, politics in indigenous communities was often 
controlled by local bosses, known as caciques.  As described by geographer June Nash, 
the caciques controlled the local distribution of resources from the Indigenous National 
Institute (INI).  In the process they maintained their personal power as well as the power 
of the PRI.232  At the same time, the caciques also violently suppressed political 
opposition.  In the case of Amatenango del Valle in the 1970s, where the leader of a 
women’s pottery co-op was assassinated at the behest of the cacique for running against 
him in a local election.233  These functionaries have further exacerbated such 
stratification through the practice of using the banner of Mayan tradition as a justification 
for expelling anyone they deem as falling outside of local traditions in order to seize their 
lands, a practice that began in the 1970s.  While visiting a number of jungle colonies 
during the 1990s, June Nash found that a good number of the settlers within the jungle 
were victims of the caciques’ predations.234  Despite these numerous examples that 
contradict the EZLN’s picture of indigenous unity against the government, the 
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organisation mentions none of them.  Its silence on the matter recalls Conservation 
International’s failure to recognize opposition to its policies in the reserve.  However, 
with the EZLN this behaviour is all the more striking since it is not a foreign NGO whose 
ideas are formulated outside of Mexico, but a grassroots political organization operating 
in the very political landscape that it seeks to change. 
 In light of this it is worth mentioning that the Fifth Declaration From the 
Lacandón Jungle lists the indigenous groups that the EZLN claims to stand alongside.  
Among these names is a group known as ‘Lacandón.’235  The name “Lacandón” has been 
used to refer to various Maya groups that inhabited the Lacandón jungle since the 
beginning of the Spanish conquest.  Currently it applies to a group of Maya that scholars 
believe migrated to the jungle in the eighteenth century from an area around Lake Petén 
in Guatemala, though this ancestry is still somewhat uncertain due to the process of 
cultural change that has shaped the Lacandones’ culture over time.236  The current group 
lived in small clans throughout the jungle and had very limited contact with the outside 
world until after the Second World War, when the Mexican government’s land reform 
policies began bringing in settlers from outside the region.237   In the conflict over Montes 
Azules they fall squarely on the side of the government and against the Zapatistas.  There 
have been reports of confrontations between the Lacandones and the settlers, the most 
notable being the incident in the community of Neuvo San Rafeal. 
On 10 April 2003, some forty Chol and Lacandón Maya arrived in the community 
on a government boat armed with machetes and pistols and threatened the residents, 
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ordering them to leave.  They said that the Regional Lacandón Assembly had decided to 
forcibly evict the community within days and this was Nuevo San Rafeal’s second 
warning.238  Many of the Zapatistas’ supporters outside of the jungle base communities 
took this as evidence of the government’s “counterinsurgency strategy.”239  Yet the 
EZLN, who had never shied away from attacking the government, remained 
conspicuously silent on the incident.  In fact there seems to be no mention of the 
Lacandones in official Zapatista statements outside of the Fifth Declaration, let alone 
their conflict with the settlers. 
 It is illuminating to contrast the official stance of the Zapatistas on this matter 
with that of the settler communities who have been the most vocal on the issue, such as 
the Autonomous Municipality of Ricardo Flores Magón.  The municipality had 
mentioned the Lacandones extensively in the February 2002 letter where it presented its 
history of the jungle and its grievances.  In it, the community refers to the government’s 
land concession to the Lacandón Maya as a “latifundio,”240 a term for the large 
agricultural estates of Mexico, which casts the Lacandón concession in a disparaging 
light by equating it with the plantations that deprived peasants of viable agricultural land.  
In a letter dated 25 March 2002, the community also claimed that the Lacandones’ had 
been coached by the government and businessmen in their calls for the eviction of the 
settlers.  Thus, they were being manipulated by the pillars of the Mexican political 
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system.241  The most telling statement though comes from the Municipality’s account of 
the jungle around the time of conquest.  The letter states that the jungle was once 
inhabited by the “true Lacandón…a dignified, rebel, warrior people,” who resisted the 
Spanish conquest for one-hundred and fifty years until they were wiped out in 1695.242  
The letter then goes on to relate how in 1700 a group of Caribe indigenous from 
Campeche and Mérida arrived in the jungle.  It claims that they experienced no problems 
with the Conquistadores, who in turn felt that both groups were peaceable and obeyed 
their rules.  Finally the letter states that in 1971, around the time of the establishment of 
the Lacandón land concession the government changed their name to ‘Lacandón’ and 
tried to present them as the direct descendents of the forests’ original inhabitants.243  
Other settlers have followed this political line and called the Lacandón “Caribes” in 
reference their supposed outsider origins.244 
The settlers’ views of the Lacandón Maya reflect the underlying beliefs and 
tensions that drive this conflict.  By claiming that the Lacandones desire to evict them is 
purely due to manipulation by government officials and businessmen the settlers deny the 
Lacandones’ free agency.  This reinforces their belief that the conflict is purely between 
indigenous Mexicans and the political establishment.  In turn this belief is also buttressed 
by their claims that the Lacandón were invited to settle jungle by the Spanish.  Even the 
nomenclature they use, such as the insistence on calling the jungle’s original inhabitants 
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the “true Lacandón” and claiming that the naming of its current inhabitants was only a 
ploy by the government, feeds into this mythology.  Just as the EZLN asserted its own 
legitimacy in its emphasis on its history of rebellion, the settlers paint the Lacandón 
Maya as collaborators in order to deny them their historical legitimacy.  Having 
questioned the legitimacy with which they hold their name as well as their reasons for 
demanding that the settlers’ be expelled from the reserve, they now question the 
Lacandones’ status as Mexicans as well.  One of the running themes of the Zapatistas’ 
rhetoric is that historically, whatever government was in power, the Mexican government 
has mostly served foreign interests rather than those of the nation.245  As such, any 
statement about the Lacandones’ national origins likely reflects on Zapatismo’s latent 
patriotic/nationalist tendencies.  Furthermore, it serves as an attempt on the part of the 
settlers to question the Lacandón Maya’s status as Mexicans. 
However, most of the arguments listed above do not hold up against historical 
fact.  The current Lacandón group apparently did migrate to the area some years ago.  But 
contrary to the Municipality’s claims this migration had occurred after the Spanish had 
depopulated the jungle of an earlier group of Ch’olti speaking Maya through conquest 
and resettlement.246  This interpretation is more logical considering the effort that the 
Spanish put into destroying the texts and artefacts of traditional Mayan culture.  
Moreover, though the Spanish had made an effort to pacify the jungle’s inhabitants, after 
this effort they showed almost no interest in colonizing the jungle due to its unsuitability 
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for agricultural land and the apparent lack of extractable resources such as gold.247  
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the charge that the government gave this 
group of Maya the “Lacandón” appellation in the 1970s in order to lay claim to the forest.  
Nowhere in the historical record are they ever referred to as Caribes.  Journalist Victor 
Perera distinctly recalls the Indians being referred to as “Lacandones” during his 
childhood in 1930s including some who were on display under this name at a 1935 
national fair held by the Guatemalan dictator, General Jorge Ubico.248  This demonstrates 
that it was a common name for the group well before the Mexican government got much 
involved in the jungle. 
Based on the historiography of research on the Lacandón Maya, it is more likely 
that the name comes from the assumption that the current Lacandón Maya group had 
inhabited the Lacandón jungle since conquest.  Both Perera and linguist Robert Bruce 
state in their 1970s research on the Lacandón Maya that while the group’s origins are in 
dispute, they are believed to be direct descendents of the original Lacandón Maya who 
survived in isolated communities in the jungle.  Their reasoning is based on the degree to 
which Lacandón culture resembled pre-conquest Mayan culture, particularly their 
language which bears a recognizable similarity to portions of ancient Maya codices and 
inscriptions from Palenque.  They also noted that the group had no migration myths and 
regarded as the centre of the Earth either one of the two nearest ancient Maya ceremonial 
centres, Palenque in the North and Yaxchilán in the South, both said to be where the gods 
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supposedly created man.249  This was the widely held opinion of previous scholars such 
as Alfred Tozzer as well as Frans and Gertrude Duby Blom, who believed the 
Lacandones’ they represented a remnant of ancient, pre-contact Maya peoples.250  This 
belief seems to have been partly fostered by the fact that they lived near a set of ancient 
Maya ruins, and because their culture lacked any apparent European influence.251 
However, according to archaeologist Joel Pelka, recent scholarly opinion on the 
Lacandón now holds that they likely descended from Chiapan Yucatec Maya or migrated 
from the Yucatán Peninsula in Petén due to the fact that they speak Yucatec Maya .252  
That the settlers assume there is something sinister to this discrepancy rather than the 
mere imperfections of historical research is indicative of just how deep their bitterness 
over the reserve runs. 
Another telling aspect of the settlers’ viewpoint is how their image of the 
Lacandón conveniently runs counter to the EZLN’s own self-image of standing up to the 
five hundred years of political oppression.  The settlers’ historical views set the Lacandón 
up as outsiders who are the pawns of Mexico’s power brokers.  Yet considering both the 
history and geography involved, this point appears to be a nebulous one.  The settlers 
never state where the alleged Caribes came from while scholarly opinion is uncertain 
whether they come from the Yucatán peninsula or Colonial period Yucatec Maya 
populations in the jungle.  Even if they came from the peninsula around Lake Petén it is 
uncertain as to when this particular Lacandón migrated to the jungle, save that missions 
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only began encountering them in 1850 and 1860.253  That they insist on the definitiveness 
of the group’s geographical origins despite the nebulousness of historical research and the 
fact that the Lacandón Maya’s ethnic origins indicate that they are Yucatec Maya rather 
than Caribes draws attention to Zapatismo’s nationalist tendencies discussed earlier.  The 
insistence of the settlers on claiming ethnic and national origins that may not even apply 
seem to be an extension of the Zapatistas’ nationalist tendencies that were discussed 
earlier.  The settlers’claims that the Lacandón are merely outsiders seems to parallel the 
EZLN’s belief that the Mexican government is more concerned with profiteering than the 
good of the nation.  Since the Lacandón Indians have aligned themselves with the Federal 
government, the settlers have taken it on themselves to impose their own definitions of 
the group according to Zapatista ideas regarding the nature of the conflict in the reserve. 
The EZLN’s questioning the national and ethnic origins of the Lacandón involve 
an attempt to apply a measure of authenticity to the group against the Zapatista standard 
of indigenousness.  However, this rhetoric buys into an old myth that has often plagued 
anthropological study of indigenous cultures.  This myth was identified and critiqued by 
ethnographer John M. Watanabe in his study of the Chimalteco Maya of Guatemala.  
According to Watanabe one of the great mistakes of anthropologists in the past was to 
view that Mayan culture from an “essentialist” perspective.  This perspective held that 
there was some original, primordial Mayan identity; were it to change this would make 
the group “less Mayan.”254  Watanabe says that his awareness of this perspective began 
when he set out to study the Chimalteco.  Upon his arrival in their community, he found 
that the Chimalteco did not define their identity according to an allegiance to a set of old 
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traditions.  Instead they defined themselves according to long-standing community 
relationships and local reputation.255  The importance of Watanabe’s observations is that 
a culture is always contingent upon the meanings that its practitioners give it.  Attempting 
to assign a fixed value to cultural identity not only ignores the nature of cultural change, 
but how culture itself is subjectively defined.  Up until the 1980s, this problem was 
prevalent in scholarship on the Lacandón Indians, where scholars frequently believed 
they represented the descendents of the ancient Maya who built the great cities seen in 
lowland ruins.256  As a consequence, the Lacandón Maya were romanticized as being free 
of modern influence and frequently in danger of losing their culture due to the sudden 
penetration of outsiders into the jungle.257 
The Zapatistas’ definition of indigenous identity in terms of political rights 
disproves this narrow focus on adherence to ancient traditions.  Yet the Zapatistas 
themselves also engage in similarly narrow thinking, and thus their stance on indigenous 
identity is rather inconsistent.  The settlers’ remarks regarding the Lacandones’ historical 
origins and political legitimacy make it clear that they believe that being an indigenous 
Mexican involves a degree of authenticity.  This, in turn, would also explain why the 
EZLN fails to mention the Lacandón or any indigenous group that opposes its goals in its 
official statements.  Groups like the Lacandón do not fit into the image of being 
indigenous that it has presented in its statements.  However, the ELZN does not attack 
those groups that do not fit this image the way the settlers do.  Instead it merely does not 
make mention of them.  That way the organisation’s portrayal of utter solidarity among 
Mexico’s indigenous people remains intact.  Yet the image that the organisation has 
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presented of all of Mexico’s indigenous people arrayed against government oppression 
and corruption, a product of its history dealing with those problems, does not 
acknowledge that indigenous people in the country have many different interests.  In so 
far as the jungle and the Montes Azules reserve is concerned, the Lacandón have opted to 
support the government and the reserve not simply due to ecology, but because the 
preservation of a large area of the jungle allows them to maintain their way of life which 
has adapted to jungle landscape.258 
Given this situation, it is not hard to understand why they have sided with the 
government and demanded that the settlers be ejected.  Many Lacandón leaders have 
claimed that the settlers’ are felling trees and destroying the material basis of their way of 
life.259  On the other hand, it is not so clear whether this objection is true for to the 
entirety of the Lacandón Maya.  Since the establishment of the land concession in 1972, a 
conflict has emerged among the Lacandón surrounding the issues of government logging 
activities and the activity of evangelical missionaries.  The conversion of many Lacandón 
to evangelical Christianity led not only to a rejection of aspects of their traditional 
culture, but often was accompanied by them signing logging contracts with the 
government.  One of these converts, José Pepe Chan Bol, set himself up as the 
representative for all of the Lacandón despite the fact that those who held onto old 
Lacandón culture opposed the logging concessions.260  During their stay with the 
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Lacandón, Victor Perera and Robert Bruce travelled to Mexico City to help a Lacandón 
scholar named K’in Yuk deliver a petition to the President protesting José Pepe’s 
attempts to cut the forest’s mahogany.261   The great irony of this is that Conservation 
International and the Federal Government have presented the Lacandón as the best hope 
for conserving the jungle based on their traditional agriculture when the majority of them 
have dropped many of their traditional economic pursuits.262 
This also brings the discussion back to the failure of the conservationists and the 
Federal Government’s approach to handling the jungle.  Though CI and the government 
have tried to portray the Lacandón as “stewards” of the jungle based on a romanticized 
vision of a traditional culture and way of life, it is one that most Lacandón no longer 
follow.  Meanwhile, Lacandón political leaders acquiesce in supporting logging 
concessions in the region.  The settlers aligned with the Zapatistas are portrayed as 
environmental villains, newcomers whose way of life threatens the jungle.  However, a 
great number of the illegal settlements pre-date both the Montes Azules Biosphere 
Reserve as well as the establishment of the territories of the Lacandón.  Some have 
developed sustainable forms of agriculture despite conservationists’ claims that the 
settlers are only destroying the forest.  The practices are also consistent with the EZLN’s 
professed ideas and practice of self-governance that the organisation says has guided its 
supporters since at least 1980s.   CI’s claims of involving local populations are difficult to 
believe, given how hostile the two populations in the reserve are towards one another.  
While the ELZN claims to speak for all Indians, its conflict with the government 
has led it to define indigenous culture in terms of that conflict and what side a group falls 
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on.  It primarily defines “indigenous” based on a set of historical rights that have been 
denied to its members by the Mexican government and defines the struggle in the Montes 
Azules conflict in those terms.  Furthermore, it portrays the conflict over these rights as 
one in which all of Mexico’s indigenous groups are united together against the 
government.  Yet the EZLN has never had the unanimous support of Mexico’s 
indigenous groups.  In the case of Montes Azules, it is opposed by the Lacandón Maya, 
an indigenous group that claims that the settlers are damaging the jungle, which the 
Lacandón rely upon to support themselves.  The EZLN’s popular base in turn has lashed 
out at the Lacandón for not being truly indigenous because they support the Mexican 
government, regardless of the Lacandón’s reasons for doing so.  Meanwhile the EZLN 
seems to ignore the conflict in its public statements as though it does not wish to 
compromise the image it has presented of it being in solidarity with all of Mexico’s 
indigenous groups, particularly when it comes to opposing the government.  All of this 
only emphasizes the failure of the federal government and CI’s conservation policies  By 
excluding the settlers from any substantive decision making over the reserve, they have 
further polarized the conflict between the settlers and the Lacandón, reinforcing the 
grievances that drove the EZLN’s rebellion in the first place.  As such the long standing 
conflict with the government continues to define the relations between the Zapatista 
settlers and the Lacandón, ensuring that they will remain hostile to each other as the 
government fails to come to terms with the Zapatistas’ demands for control over their 
own political and economic decision making. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has explored how the conflict between the settlers in the Montes 
Azules Biosphere Reserve and the efforts of Conservation International is primarily 
driven by the EZLN’s ideological conception of Mexico’s indigenous people.  Despite 
CI’s portrayal of the situation as merely being a struggle between efforts to preserve the 
jungle’s fragile ecosystem and fulfilling the needs of Mayan settlers, the actual situation 
has proven to be much more complex.  The settlers and the EZLN object to the 
government’s presence in the reserve on the basis that it has continually ignored their 
rights as indigenous people and because the government’s actions already threaten the 
jungle’s integrity.  Its military maneuvers have already felled large swatches of trees 
within the jungle and its development projects aimed at the south-east of Mexico would 
guarantee a disastrous impact on the land.  As a result the Zapatistas see guarding 
indigenous rights and preserving the jungle as mutually inclusive.  This view is informed 
by their longstanding conflict with the government over the matter of indigenous rights, 
or at least the version of those rights championed by the EZLN. 
Outside of the main arguments over the Reserve, the roots of the conflict over 
Montes Azules lie in the role of land in Mexico’s political history.  The rebel leader 
Zapata created a political platform based on the needs of the Mexican peasant class from 
which he came.  That platform called for land redistribution as well as local control and 
became the rallying crying for agrarian rebels across the country.  Consequently the 
Mexican political establishment eventually adopted the land reform aspects of the plan in 
order to maintain stability in the countryside.  This program was combined with the 
establishment of a corporatist state ruled by a single party.  This system managed to end 
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the factionalism of the decade of 1910 to 1920 as to reduce the political unrest of the 
period, at least until the student uprisings in 1968.  However, this system was limited by 
the fact that it failed to significantly change the overall socioeconomic conditions of 
Mexico.  When the government abandoned land reform in the 1980s the old stability was 
threatened by agrarian unrest, forcing the government to rely more and more on military 
force to maintain order.  One of the end results of this situation was the formation and 
eventual rebellion of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, a guerrilla army formed by 
indigenous farmers in Chiapas.  Originally it provided a means defence against the 
military.  Later it became a way to launch a rebellion and thus articulate their plight and 
demands to the rest of the country. 
  It was under these circumstances that the EZLN butted heads with the 
Washington DC based environmental group Conservation International.  Despite CI’s 
ostensible support for local control over conservation efforts neither it nor the EZLN have 
co-operated with each other on the matter of settlers within the reserve and their potential 
impact on the jungle.  This conflict stems from the two organizations’ substantially 
differing worldviews.  The EZLN’s frame of reference comes from the daily living 
circumstances of the peasants of south-eastern Chiapas and ideas about the history of 
indigenous people in Mexico, which are partly based on the Mexican Revolution.  CI’s 
views are shaped by a scientific viewpoint, which favours value-free detachment and 
treating problems as technical matters.  As a result, CI favours assigning single causes to 
the environmental problems in the reserve, such as peasant agriculture, while ignoring 
that its ally, the Mexican government, has contributed much to deforestation through its 
own actions.  Following this reasoning, CI’s officials actually denigrate the very concepts 
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of indigenous identity that the EZLN and the settlers adhere to, and with it the idea that 
conservation efforts should be controlled locally, something that CI publicly supports.  It 
also means that CI ignores the economic problems that drive settlement into reserve 
areas.  In the process CI cuts off any opportunity for cooperation with the Zapatistas 
because it rejects addressing the issues that matter most to the EZLN. 
 Whatever obstacle that CI’s approach poses to resolving the dispute in the reserve, 
its conflict with the settlers is in some ways a proxy of the EZLN’s larger conflict with 
the Mexican government.  The Zapatista National Liberation Army was originally formed 
in response to the military’s suppression of independent political organizing in Chiapas 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  The PRI government responded to the 1994 rebellion with 
military force, but was forced to back off due to protests from Mexican civil society.  Yet 
the government continued to use the military against the Zapatistas, even after signing the 
San Andrés Accords with the EZLN in 1996.  This caused the EZLN to refuse to 
negotiate with the government until after Vicente Fox was elected President in 2001. 
Fox’s election opened the way to the EZLN travelling to Mexico City to see that 
the indigenous rights bill stemming out of the accords was passed and possibly start new 
negotiations with the government thereafter.  However, the watering down of certain key 
provisions, especially those regarding autonomous government for Mexico’s indigenous 
people, by deputies of Fox’s National Action Party and the PRI led the EZLN to cut off 
all contact with the government and return to the jungle in protest.  The issue of 
autonomous overlaps with the EZLN’s objections to conservation programs in the reserve 
as they are regarded as the product of a distant body of planners infringing on the rights 
of indigenous people.  Another important factor is the inconsistencies between 
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government’s support of CI and the large infrastructure projects it has planned for south-
eastern Chiapas in order to foster commerce in Southern Mexico and Central America.   
These projects would both displace communities in the region and damage the jungle 
through the construction of roads and hydroelectric dams.  As a result the Zapatistas’ 
conclude that upholding their ideals is also necessary to protect the jungle, the land upon 
which they depend. 
It is clear that this conflict has been shaped by, and in turn even strengthened, the 
EZLN’s ideas of what constitutes indigenous identity.  At the same time it has led them to 
place sharp limits in applying this identity to all of Mexico’s indigenous people.  The 
EZLN built up an indigenous identity based on a concept of indigenous rights derived 
from the program of Emiliano Zapata and its partial adoption by the Mexican state.  The 
EZLN’s various experiences with neglect and violence on the part of state has led it to set 
itself up as a defender of these rights against the power of the state.  However, the EZLN 
fails to acknowledge that not all indigenous people in Mexico, or even Chiapas, 
necessarily support it.  Many indigenous communities opposed the 1994 uprising due to 
their allegiance to the PRI, and at least one Zapatista community that was loyal to the 
PRD was not welcoming to Zapatista activists. 
With this in mind it is not surprising that the EZLN shows no signs of 
acknowledging that the Lacandón Maya are opposed to its efforts in Montes Azules.  The 
Lacandón have sided with the government because they regard the reserve as necessary to 
protect their land from degradation by settlers.  While the EZLN’s official statements 
never make mention of this, the Lacandones’ position is acknowledged by the settler 
population who regard them as having been manipulated by the government.  The settlers 
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even question whether Lacandón Maya are truly indigenous.  The settlers’ regard for the 
Lacandón as ‘puppets’ with a false claim to their name, because they will not accept that 
other indigenous groups have interests that may clash with their own. 
The fight in the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, along with the EZLN’s 
resistance to the demands of Conservation International and the Mexican government, 
illustrates how conceptions of identity are shaped.  In this case, an indigenous rebel 
movement reacts to matters of resource and conservation issues in terms of its self-
anointed role as a defender of indigenous rights against a government that has often 
ignored such issues or treated those drawing attention to them with brutality.  In the 
EZLN’s view being indigenous requires the right to autonomous government and control 
over resources.  The government’s record on conservation confirms and hardens the 
EZLN’s support for local and regional autonomy as well as strengthens the organization’s 
resolve that these issues are central to indigenous identity and survival.  The EZLN sees 
environmental groups like Conservation International as not that much different in nature 
from the government since these groups ignore and even denigrate the concepts of 
indigenous identity that the EZLN has championed, while hypocritically proclaiming in 
their public reports that they always work with indigenous people.  Submitting to CI’s 
demands in the EZLN’s view would ultimately be asking it to surrender its identity.  This 
would not only be dangerous to the jungle but would represent a threat to the survival of 
indigenous identity in southern Mexico. 
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For Conserving the Lacandón Jungle 
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Two tables from Conservation Executive Summary of Selva Lacandona: Siglo XXI 
Estrategia Conjunta Para Biodiversidad listing critical locations for conserving the 
Lacandón jungle.  All locations are listed in order of priority.263
                                                
263 “Resume Ejecutivo - Selva Lacandona Siglo XXI Estrategia Conjunta Para la Conservación de la 
Biodiversidad” <http://www.ci-mesamerica.orgPDFS/resumen.PRF> (30 June 2006). 
Appendix Two – Maps of Communities within Montes Azules 
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Map of the communities located within the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve’s buffer 
zone.  Among the communities threatened by the reserve are Emiliano Zapata, Agua 
Azul, Tierra y Libertad, Vientes de Noviembre (13 of November), Palestina (now Nuevo 
Palestina), El Zapotal, and Villas Rosas. 
 
It should be noted that the Reserve encompasses is 331,200 hectares. 264 
                                                
264  N.A.. N.D., “Breve Historia de la Selva Lacandona” 
<http://chiapas.pangea.org/html/item0080.htm#mapa4> (30 June 2006); N.A.. N.D., “Breve Historia de la 
Selva Lacandona” <http://chiapas.pangea.org/html/item0080.htm#mapa3> (23 August 2006). 
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Map of the same communities within the original planned boundaries of the reserve, 
superimposed on the territory of the Lacandón Community Zone.  The black line 
represents the Reserve boundaries which encompass some 331,200 hectares.  The blue 
line representing the surrounding area is the Lacandón Community which encompasses 
some 614,000 hectares. 265 
                                                
265 N.A.. N.D., “Breve Historia de la Selva Lacandona” 
<http://chiapas.pangea.org/html/item0080.htm#mapa3> (30 June 2006); N.A.. N.D., “Breve Historia de la 
Selva Lacandona” <http://chiapas.pangea.org/html/item0080.htm#mapa3> (23 August 2006). 
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Appendix Four – The Lacandón Jungle in Mexico. 
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Map of the state of Chiapas in Mexico.  The Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve is 
outlined in dark green on the upper right hand side.268 
 
 
                                                
268 N.A., 20 July 2005, “SP5: ‘Racial Other’,” <http://www.mml.cam.ac.uk/spanish/SP5/race/> (15 
October, 2006).  It should be noted that the map included is from a course outline of the Department of 
Spanish and Portuguese at the University of Cambridge.  This is owing to the fact that there are dearth of 
useful maps that clearly outline where the Reserve is situated in Chiapas.  Similarly, I had to go to a travel 
website for a good map outlining Chiapas in Mexico. 
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Map of Mexico with the state of Chiapas outlined in mauve.269
                                                
269 N.A., N.D., “Mapa de Chiapas,” <http://www.map-of-mexico.co.uk/espanola/mapa-de-chiapas.htm> (15 
October, 2006). 
Appendix Five – Communties Affected by the Montes Azules Reserve According to 
the Autonomous Municipality of Ricardo Flores Magón 
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Communities Facing Total Dislocation Within the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve:270 
• Laguna el Paraíso  
• Laguna Suspiro  
• Nuevo San Pedro  
• Nuevo Guadalupe Tepeyac and  
• Nueva Cintalapa 
• 6 de Octubre  
Communties Whose Ejidal Rights Are Directly Affected by Montes Azules: 
• Chamizal 
• Cintalapa 
• El Jardín 
• La Culebra  
• Limonar  
• Plan de Ayutla 
• San Antonio Escobar 
• Santa Rita  
• Taniperla 
• Villa las Rosas and  
• Zapotal  
Communities Whose Ejidal Rights Are Directly Affected by the Lacandón Community 
Zone: 
• Arroyo Granizo 
• Lacanjá Tseltal 
• Ninos Héroes 
• Plan de Guadalupe 
• Santo Domingo 
Communities Directly Affected by the REBIMA Buffer Zone: 
• Agua Azul 
• Calvario 
• Censo  
• El Zapotal 
• Emiliano Zapata 
• Guadalupe San Luis 
• Infiernillo 
• Lacandón 
• Manuel Velasco Suarez 
                                                
270 Ricardo Flores Magón Autonomous Municipality in Rebellion, 25 March 2002 “A Shadow of Death is 
Being Raised in the Heart of Our Land, Our Mother, Our Selva,” 
<http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/2002/amc/rfmMARCH.html> (30 June 2006). 
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• Monte Líbano 
• Nuevo Monte Líbano 
• Perla de Acapulco 
• San Caralampio 
• San Francisco 
• San Jerónimo  
• San José 
• Santa Elena 
• Sibal 
• Taniperla 
• Zaragoza 
 
